

The Month in Review

THE RECENT OUSTER of three East German Communist leaders from the Party's Central Committee and Politburo and the nature of their indictment revealed many of the malignant germs which, despite the latest infusion of stern orthodoxy, are so persistently sapping the strength of East European Communism. The new pariahs, hitherto known as staunch Stalinists in one of the most Stalinist of regimes, were charged with having waged an "unprincipled factional struggle" allegedly aimed at a "democratization" of the Party, thus fostering a "penetration of bourgeois ideology." As "liberal" Communists they stand accused of having abetted the spread of "revisionism." Perhaps the most significant accusation was one directed at former Central Committee member Karl Schirdewan who, in the fall of 1956, was said to have held "the opinion that the tactics of safety valves then introduced in Poland and Hungary ought to be used in East Germany." The implications of this open political fracas are indeed startling. Even if the particulars of the charges are untrue, the existence of disunity in the highest reaches of the East German hierarchy is now a demonstrated fact. Further, the belated airing of alleged misjudgments in 1956 must be linked to the current campaign, outlined in the Moscow declaration of Communist Parties in November 1957, for a thorough quashing of all such "misjudgments" and their unwanted after-effects. It may now be assumed that this repressive line was resented not only by "liberal" Communist intellectuals, the Gomulka faction in Poland and the Yugoslavs, but also by powerful forces in outwardly orthodox Parties.

The East German purge, as shown by the unfriendly reference to Poland, revealed not only intra-Party cleavages but also continued inter-Party clashes. In recent weeks symptoms of both kinds of distemper have cropped up in almost every corner of the European Communist domain. Indications of internal rifts or differences have materialized in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. In the latter country, the problems of a house divided go back at least as far as the intellectual ferment of 1955; the significance of the latest feud is that it is a family affair—that is, between members of Gomulka's official family, appointed by him to unify the Party and silence heretical opposition. The foes were Leon Kruczowski, head of the Party's Cultural Commission, and Stefan Zolkiewski, Minister of Higher Education. The former, an unregenerate Stalinist, crassly threatened "liberal" writers; Zolkiewski promptly rebuked the official and barred any return to what he called "the deplorable atmosphere of the past." Thus, on the crucial issue of what do with erring Communist intellectuals, the Gomulka faction itself is now openly divided.

In Hungary, where First Party Secretary Kadar recently relinquished his top governmental post to Ferenc Munnich, the lack of Party cohesion is somewhat reminiscent of the New Course days of a few years ago. Once again there is every indication that there are at least two factions, one straining to preserve some of the economic reforms introduced in the post-Rakosi era, the other endeavoring to steer the country back as fast as possible to strict orthodoxy. There is of course no dispute among present leaders over the meaning of the Revolt and the necessity to apply the harshest measures against all those who took a prominent part in it. But on every other aspect of national life differences in either stress or substance are very noticeable. The main topics of controversy are recollectivization, the status of artisans, the fate of the intellectuals, the exact nature of the Patriotic People's



Front, and the extent to which the economy should be subjected to rigorous central planning. Conciliatory and relatively "liberal" speeches were recently made by Kadar and Politburo member Karoly Kiss. On the other hand, Politburo member Antal Apro, now raised to the rank of First Deputy Premier, delivered an address notable for its Stalinist fervor and intransigence. It included a direct attack by name on two Ministers in the government.

Evidence of disunity within the Bulgarian Party ranks is somewhat less concrete, but only because censorship is extraordinarily stringent. Yet this watchfulness did not prevent the Writers' Revolt, its airing and its protracted survival. As more news of the ferment slowly filters to the outside world, it is becoming increasingly evident that the intellectuals could not possibly have mustered the strength they did, nor could they still persist in their defiance had they not been backed—or perhaps even encouraged—by members of the Party's highest organs. The latest spate of articles and pronunciamientos castigating Party organizations which have failed to fight disunity in the ranks point to difficulties on all levels.

A somewhat similar situation has developed in Czechoslovakia with respect to Slovak nationalism. There is apparently a great deal of opposition in the Slovak Party to the "export" of local manpower to buttress the economy in other regions, particularly the lagging coal mines of Ostrava. There is also, according to the Party's First Secretary, resistance to central industrial planning from Prague and to the imposition of a cultural climate alien to the Province.

The sniping between Parties has been no less fierce than the brawling within them. The new wave of unfriendly criticism arose soon after the November meeting of Party heads in Moscow. It differs from the crisscrossing barrage of a year before only in that the guns fired are "unofficial"—that is, they are not distinctly the property of the official Party hierarchy. Nevertheless, all concerned must know that the ammunition could not have been released without the approval of the leaders. And as in the past the first salvos were fired by Moscow, in thinly veiled attacks in the press at Polish and Yugoslav "deviationism." Then Czechoslovakia joined the fray as the main defender of the true faith. Czechoslovak Party journalists dredged up old Polish "revisionist" articles to "prove" the "deviationist" character of the Polish road to Socialism, disregarding Gomulka's own repression of dissidents. The Poles soon counterattacked in their own press. While often appraising realities in other "Socialist" countries with critical contempt, they were in turn chided by the latter, notably the Bulgarians. The Czechoslovak press also affronted the Yugoslavs, who promptly retaliated. The Soviets, of course, kept adding fuel to the fire. Shortly before the Polish elections to the National Councils, for instance, they condescendingly warned the Poles that they were facing "rightist" deviations. The Soviets also reportedly objected to Gomulka's negotiations with the US for a second loan; the Czechoslovaks, true to form, openly voiced their opposition to the deal.

The Gomulka regime signed the new commercial agreement with the United States on February 15. And the National Councils elections were indeed at variance with normal Communist practice. Apart from the fact that the announced totals were considerably lower than the near 100 percent usual in other bloc countries, there were approximately 50 percent more candidates than offices to be filled, and some 22,500 candidates (out of a total of 300,000) were actually rejected outright by the electorate in pre-balloting "consultation" meetings. In many rural districts the Communist Party was officially a minority contestant, and reports show that where the electorate was close to the candidates (as in many rural localities) the voters used their limited power to select the more attractive personalities—often undoubtedly non-Communists. The voting was given added importance by the marked increase in power delegated to the councils by a recent law. The event was also remarkable for its influence on the whole political climate in Poland. For the first time in many months, the emphasis of internal propaganda shifted back to the "liberal" Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1956, disregarding the two harder plenums that have taken place since then.

Hence in all countries of the area, there are strong pressures both within and outside the Party to relax or modify the latest Soviet-imposed policy of repression.

Hungary's Army Under The Soviets


By General Bela Kiraly

This is the first of two articles by General Bela Kiraly, Commander in Chief of the National Guard of Hungary and the Military Commander of Budapest during the October, 1956 Revolt. In this first installment the author discusses some of the more significant changes forced in the Hungarian army by the Communist Party and the Soviets in the years following World War II. The methods used, the personalities involved and the nature of the goals are all analyzed on the basis of the General's own experiences, his observations and his access to highly revealing information, some of it hitherto unavailable to the non-Communist world. The article contains the key to an understanding of the army's role and behavior during the popular uprising, which will be the central subject of a further study. All the opinions expressed in this survey are General Kiraly's, who is also the author of both the biographical sketches (in italics) and the explanatory footnotes.

ONE DAY IN OCTOBER 1950 I was sitting in the Staff Officers' Room of the Honved Academy in Budapest.¹ I was commander of the Academy. Another officer entered the room: Colonel Dolgow, the Soviet "adviser" assigned to the regimental commander course at the Academy. I noticed that he seemed depressed, and after discussing a few theoretical questions I asked him the reason for his depression. He said that expert ophthalmologists had told him his 15-year-old son was going to lose his eyesight. This tragedy had completely crushed his spirits. I was so moved by his sorrow that all I could see in him was a despairing father, and after he left I called one of the foremost ophthalmologists and made an appointment for the boy. However, he only confirmed the previous diagnosis that nothing could be done for him.

My sympathy made me forget that the father was the representative of a hated regime, a hated Party, a hated army. I only wanted to help a suffering boy and his unhappy father. My sympathy and willingness to help deeply impressed the Soviet officer, and it was evident that he wanted to repay me in some way. When he invited me to dinner a few days later, I looked forward to the occasion with real anticipation. It was the first time during six years of Soviet occupation that I had been given a chance to enter the home of a Soviet officer, and I had such a keen curiosity that I felt almost like a scientist entering a research laboratory. I thought that under these unusual cir-

¹ During the 1956 Revolt the whole Academy supported the Freedom Fighters. For this reason its commander at the time, Col. Marton, a member of parliament, was arrested by the Kadar regime and the Academy dissolved.



The Author

cumstances the human sorrow these people were experiencing might perhaps create an atmosphere in which I could look into their minds.

I arrived at the apartment full of anticipation, quite unprepared for what I found when I entered the living room. The Soviet colonel was not alone. Present also was the Russian "adviser" to the Political Officers' School² in Budapest, a man known by everybody to be the Soviet Communist Party's chief military representative in Budapest. There was also an AVH captain from Carpatho-

² The Petofi Academy, later named Stalin Academy, which trained political officers for the army from the cadres of the Communist Party.

About the Author

BORN ON APRIL 14, 1912, in Kaposvar, in southwest Hungary.

1930-31: served as a private in the Hungarian Army.

1934-35: attended and graduated from the Ludovika Military Academy, commissioned as Lieutenant and assigned to an infantry regiment.

1939-42: attended the Hungarian General Staff College; appointed as Captain on the General Staff on October 1, 1942.

1942-45: served in the Organization Department of the Ministry of National Defense up to March 1945; service in various war theaters included:

- 1942: three months as General Staff Officer of the 4th Army Corps near the Don river;
- 1943-44: Quartermaster of the 201st Infantry Division in the Ukraine, subsequently its Chief of Staff;
- 1944 (Summer): War Operations Officer of the 6th Army Corps, later of the 1st Army;
- 1944-45: active in the Resistance Movement against the Nazis; saved a large number of Jewish forced laborers pressed into labor battalions; went over to Allies with 2,000 men and 24 guns.

1945: arrested by the Red Army and made prisoner of war; escaped from prisoners' convoy and returned to Hungary via Romania. Subsequently joined the Communist Party.

1946: appointed General Staff Officer of the new army.

1949-50: promoted to Colonel, then to General; as such was at first Commander in Chief of the Hungarian Infantry, later Commander of the General Staff College.

1951 (August): arrested and condemned to death, charged with having resisted the Sovietization of the Hungarian Army. The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment four years later. Paroled in September, 1956, after five years in prison.

1956 (October 28): became Chairman of the Revolutionary Defense Committee and soon thereafter Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Armed Forces; was elected Commander in Chief of the Hungarian National Guard.

1956 (October 30): rehabilitated by the Imre Nagy Government and appointed Military Commander of Budapest with the rank of Major General.

1956 (November 4): assumed the command of all armed resistance in Hungary after the second intervention of the Soviet Army and the kidnapping of General Maletz.

Though General Kiraly joined the Communist Party after the War he shared the ideals of the huge majority of his countrymen in hoping for the dawn of a new era of freedom and national independence. This attitude led to his arrest. In 1955 the regime tried to lure him to active Party cooperation by "releasing" him from imprisonment and actually taking him to the doorsteps of his wife's domicile, but then continuing the drive to security police headquarters. There the General was offered his rank and freedom in return for his cooperation, and was told that the death sentence would be carried out if he refused to accept the bargain. The General refused.

Ukraine, who spoke Hungarian.³ This was an embarrassing situation, even for the rigid Soviet mind, and they felt they had to give me an explanation. But the explanation was a lame one and nothing could conceal the monstrous fact that 33 years after the Bolshevik Revolution they did not feel they could permit a high-ranking Soviet officer to visit privately with a Hungarian general. Probably they were afraid that in the absence of any control the Soviet officer might have said something unwise.

This little incident suffices in itself to show the meaning of Communist tyranny, the tyranny which has brought so much misery to the enslaved nations and against which the Hungarian people rose. For them, living under tyranny and oppression was not merely a political matter—it permeated the very core of their everyday life. This has been well

³ The Oblast of Trans-Carpathia in the Ukraine was Hungarian territory before 1919, when it became the province of Ruthenia in Czechoslovakia. After World War II it was ceded to the USSR. The AVH was the Hungarian Security Police. [Ed.]

expressed by the prominent Hungarian author and poet Gyula Illyes, who was imprisoned by the Communists after the Revolt:

where there's tyranny
everyone is a link in the chain;
it stinks and pours out of you,
you are tyranny yourself;
like moles in the sunshine,
we walk in the dark,
we fidget in our chamber
as if it were the Sahara;
because where there's tyranny
all is in vain. . . .

Action always induces an equal and opposite reaction. Until 1953 Communist oppression and terror were boundless, and hence the reaction to them, the tides of bitterness and opposition, knew no limit. In order to reduce this pent-up force it was necessary to relax the Soviet pressure. This

process began with the death of Stalin, continued after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR and culminated in the summer of 1956. This explains why the Hungarian Revolt broke out in October of 1956. An outstanding feature of Hungarian history is the recurrent struggle for freedom and independence, usually against an overwhelming force. It was in the best tradition of their nation that the Hungarian people rose in October 1956 to fight for their freedom against the incomparably greater might of the Soviets.

Anti-Fascist Background of the Revolt

A number of the leaders of the October Revolt came from the ranks of those who fought against the Nazi regime during the Second World War. When the Germans occupied Hungary in 1944 they imposed the Arrow Cross dictatorship on the country. The fight against this regime was waged on many fronts, mostly underground. Numerous outstanding leaders of the Revolt, General Maletér, General István Kovács, Colonel Sándor Kopácsy⁴ and others, had been partisan guerilla leaders during the struggle against Nazism. General Maletér, trained by the Russians as a partisan, carried out several parachute actions against the Nazis and received several Soviet decorations for bravery. General Kovács and Colonel Kopácsy had likewise fought as partisans against the Nazi forces. The former Mayor of Budapest, József Kovágo, had been a member of the anti-Nazi underground in Hungary; during the Revolt he was again elected Mayor of Budapest. Ferenc Vidovits, who organized the Revolt in Somogy County, had also been an anti-Nazi, but the Communists had sentenced him to 25 years in prison.

During the Revolt Vidovits established a radio station. His last broadcast, made on November 4 after the return of the Soviet troops to crush the Revolt, was addressed to all civilized countries: "I can hear the rumble of the Soviet tanks in the distance as their advancing caterpillars tear into Hungarian soil. . . . S. O. S. Civilized peoples all over the world, help us. The boat is sinking, the light is fading and the shadows grow. S. O. S. Civilized peoples, help."

Resistance to the Nazi occupation was carried on by a coalition of parties, including Communists. A tragic consequence of Hungary's geographic position was that only the Soviet armies fought on Hungarian territory, and thus Hungarians who wanted to fight against Nazi oppression had no choice but to join with the only allied forces on their soil. The resistance, which included members of the Smallholders' Party, the Peasant Party, the Social Democratic Party and non-party people, was clearly tied to the same forces which later made the October Revolt. That part of the army which supported the Freedom Fighters also consisted of men who had opposed the Nazis during World War II, either by fighting against them directly or by going over to the Soviets.

⁴ General Pal Maletér was appointed Minister of Defense by Imre Nagy after his famous stand at the Kilian Barracks. General István Kovács was made Chief of Staff. Col. Sándor Kopácsy had been Chief of Police in Budapest and Deputy Commander in Chief of the National Guard.

The Postwar Hungarian Army

UNDER THE GUIDANCE of the government of Béla Miklós Dalnoki, formed on December 22, 1944, Hungary joined the war against Germany. The First and part of the Sixth Army divisions, commanded by General János Voross, invaded Austria to demonstrate that Hungarian soldiers also wanted to fight on the side of the Allies. In the rear of these divisions near Hajmáskér other units went over to the Allies and formed the Third Division. If these divisions did not fight actively against the Nazis, it was not for lack of enthusiasm but because the Allies had broken the last Nazi resistance and the war came to an end. At this time it was in the Soviet interest to have as strong a Hungarian armed force as possible. For this reason an anti-Nazi attitude was all that was required for admittance to the army, and there was nothing to prevent the development of an anti-fascist, patriotic Hungarian army.

The Third Division was demobilized at the end of the war. The First and Sixth Divisions, along with units of engineers, auxiliary groups and supply formations, remained to form the nucleus of the new army in the fall of 1945. The First Division was stationed in the western part of Trans-Danubia, the Sixth Division in the middle of Trans-Danubia, and other units throughout the country.

It was then that the Hungarian Army came to know the two most hated institutions in the Soviet system: the "orientation officers" (later known as "political officers")⁵ and the "D officers"⁶ (security police). These groups, the organs of Soviet indoctrination, influence and control, aroused a spontaneous hatred. It is notable that even in those early days these Communist organs bore conspicuous signs of corruption, cruelty, immorality and ignorance. They succeeded, where the Nazis had failed, in introducing systematic spying and denunciation—so alien to the Hungarian spirit. When I was chief of staff of the First Division in 1946 we arrested a "D officer" on charges of stealing wood, and an "orientation officer" on charges of black marketeering. But we were unable to arrest two other "orientation officers," even though charges had been proved against them, nor could we prosecute a Party Secretary who rented out army machinery for his personal profit. The Party would not permit their removal because

⁵ The orientation officers were under the command of Colonel István Belezny, head of the Training and Education Department of the Ministry of Defense. In May 1947 a separate "Educational Super-Department" was organized within the Ministry under the control of Major Dr. Ferenc Janossy, a Protestant minister and son-in-law of Imre Nagy. In 1948 this became a "Commanding Group" and after the Communist rule had been consolidated, in September 1948, it became the "Political Chief-Commanding Group" under Sándor Nogradi, who was made First Deputy Minister of Defense. Nogradi, a former ironworker, is now the Kádár Regime's ambassador to Peking.

⁶ The task of the "D officers" was espionage, counterintelligence and political investigation. Until 1947 they were supposedly confined to investigating fascists, subversives and war criminals. But even in 1946 they had extended their work to cases of conspiracy, sabotage and deviationism and carried out their work with the utmost cruelty. Head of this department until the spring of 1948 was Lt. General György Pálffy-Ostereicher, later arrested and hanged. After his arrest the job was given to Lt. General György Revesz, a Soviet citizen who is now Minister of Defense under Kádár. In 1949 the department's counterintelligence activities were taken over by the security police.

they could have been replaced only by still shadier characters.

Even then the "orientation" and "D" officers were not workers or peasants but mainly people of intellectual or semi-intellectual background who had failed in their chosen careers: former priests, unemployed teachers, unsuccessful writers and technicians. In those days there were also a few idealists, who had become orientation officers in the hope of imparting democratic ideals to Hungarian youth, but these people soon became frustrated and left.

The Communists Take Over

IN THE SUMMER OF 1945 we still believed that in spite of these difficulties we would be able to build a strong democratic army. The fall of that year brought a bitter disappointment to the Soviets and to the Hungarian Communists. The first general election, carried out in democratic fashion, ended in an overwhelming victory for the national, democratic ideals. The Smallholders' Party got 56 percent of the vote. Before the election the extreme left-wing factions had been firmly convinced that they would get a large majority.

These results not only alarmed the Soviets and the Hungarian Communists but forced them to adopt a new course. They were in effective control—Soviet Marshal Voroshilov was head of the Allied Control Commission, and the Soviets were the only occupying power—and now they decided to use their strength. First, a Communist was appointed Minister of the Interior. Then, in order to destroy the country's power, the army was rapidly demobilized. Most of the officers were removed by a screening process, some for being pro-Nazi and others pro-Western. By a number of reorganizations the various units were reduced in size. In the summer of 1946 came another important step: most of the remaining officers, a large proportion of the troops, and even most of the weapons, were transferred from the battle divisions to the frontier guards. This was the first typically Communist maneuver, and one characteristic of Soviet methods of interference. The order for the move came from Soviet Lt. General Sviridov, acting head of the Allied Control Commission, and was given to Col. Palfy-Ostereicher who was in charge of the military-security department of the army (see note 6). The military-security department worked out the details of the reorganization, which ended with the frontier guards being taken away from the Ministry of Defense and grouped in a new Frontier Guard Command headed by Palfy-Ostereicher, who was shortly promoted to general.

Gyorgy Palfy-Ostereicher was born in 1910, graduated from the Ludovika Academy and became an artillery officer. In 1936 he entered the Staff Officers' Academy. In 1940, when he became engaged to the niece of Tibor Szamuely, the infamous head of the Revolutionary Terror under Bela Kun in 1919, he was forced to leave the army. Joining the Communist underground, he emerged after the war as a servant of the new regime. In 1949 he was arrested, tried for treason along with Laszlo Rajk, and executed.

The division chiefs of staff, including myself, were sum-



General Palfy-Ostereicher. As head of the "military-security department" he was one of the chief instruments of the Soviets in their subversion of the Hungarian army. This photo appeared, in black border, in *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), October 6, 1956, on the occasion of his re-burial (with Laszlo Rajk) shortly before the Revolt.

moned to the military-security department in Budapest and told to carry out this order under strict secrecy. The whole atmosphere of the conference suggested that it was an illegal maneuver. We were ordered to return to our units promptly and, with the excuse of urgency, we were even forbidden to visit anyone in Budapest. I knew I had to do something, but under these circumstances I could not risk going to the Ministry of Defense. Instead I went to a small restaurant in the outskirts of Budapest and called a high official in the Ministry of Defense, asking him to come to me. He did, and I told him of the events. He promptly contacted the Minister of Defense, Jeno Tombor,⁷ who filed a protest with the Soviet head of the Allied Control Commission and with the Western representatives on the Commission. But Soviet pressure on the government forced the order to be carried out. The Frontier Guards thus became the only effective military force in Hungary, headed by the faithful Communist Palfy and with another Communist, Col. Dezsö Nemeth, as Chief of Staff.

Staff Colonel Dezsö Nemeth was also a graduate of the

⁷ Tombor was a member of the Smallholders' Party, and after their victory in the election of 1945 he had become Minister of Defense. During World War II he was a noted military commentator.



Former Minister of Defense and Politburo member Mihaly Farkas, shown here in a general's uniform. This sadist, imprisoned under Kadar, ruthlessly carried out Soviet orders for the reorganization of the Hungarian Army.

Photo from *Beke es Szabadsag* (Budapest), January 27, 1952

Ludovika Academy. He had been a corps quartermaster at the end of the war, when he went over to the Soviet troops in Budapest. A close friend of his superior Palfy, he was arrested and hanged with him in 1949.

From this time on, resistance to Communist control of the army took two forms. Within our individual units we tried to prevent the "D officers" and the "orientation officers" from removing trustworthy officers from the army without valid reason. Since at that time the D and orientation officers were still responsible to the chiefs of staff, I demanded that all charges and accusations be submitted to me in writing and supported by documentary evidence. In this way it was possible to prevent the purging of loyal officers. At the same time we waged a fierce battle on a higher level between loyal staff officers and the pro-Soviet Communists. The latter forces were represented by three generals: Palfy, Illy, and Solyom.

Gusztav Illy and Laszlo Solyom were both graduates of the Ludovika Academy and both artillery officers. In 1939 they were removed from the Academy for Staff Officers because of their Jewish descent. Leaving the army, they became active in underground resistance movements during

the war. Solyom was the military expert of the civic section of the Smallholders' Party. After the war Illy joined the Communist Party, and in 1947 Solyom also admitted to being a Communist. Illy became head of personnel for the Ministry of Defense, and Solyom Chief of Police in Budapest. In 1946 Solyom joined the army as a major general and later became Chief of Staff. In 1950 both Illy and Solyom were arrested and executed.

Although Solyom was at this time a member of the Smallholders' Party and pretended to adhere to its principles, he soon showed his true colors. He and the other two generals did everything they could to bring the army under their control. They attempted to remove all officers, particularly senior officers, who were unwilling to comply fully with their wishes. They were assisted in their efforts by Major General Daroczi, aide-de-camp to the Minister of Defense. For example, Minister of Defense Jeno Tombor would discuss with General Albert Bartha the list of officers whose removal was demanded by the Party leaders, and agree upon those they thought should be retained even in the face of extreme Communist pressure. After their conferences they confirmed their decisions in writing. But General Bartha soon found that the written lists did not correspond with the decisions they had made in conference, and it did not take long to discover that their correspondence was being tampered with by Daroczi. This officer, who had originally been a movie director, had become a general after the war. While he pretended to be a loyal patriot, these manipulations showed that he was actually a pro-Soviet Communist agent. The discovery of Daroczi's treason seems to have been the last blow to Defense Minister Tombor, whose courageous struggle against the Communists had undermined his health. He died at his desk.

Tombor was succeeded by General Bartha,⁸ who was well known for his democratic views. He continued the struggle against Communist pressure with the vigor of his predecessor. In the spring of 1947 my division was stationed at Szekszard, and on the occasion of a flag dedication for one of our units we decided to have a celebration. General Bartha officiated, and on our request he declared the day an army holiday. Members of the Allied Control Commission and members of the government, headed by President Zoltan Tildy, came to the ceremony. We put up elaborate decorations at the place of the ceremony and along the route of the procession. We borrowed huge flags from the British and American missions, which we displayed along with large Hungarian flags, while in contrast we hung very small Soviet flags. We wanted to show the government and the foreign dignitaries that even though the Hungarian army had been crippled it still had the courage, under the shadow of Soviet arms, to turn toward the West and to resist becoming a Soviet instrument.

Thus resistance continued in small deeds and symbolic acts. But it could not be strong enough against the Communists backed by Soviet might.

⁸ General Bartha, a former professor at the Austro-Hungarian Staff College, had been Quartermaster of the Transylvanian Army during World War I and Minister of Defense in the Karolyi government of 1918. He now lives in the United States.

At the Point of a Gun

IN FEBRUARY 1947 the military-security department of the army arrested 93 persons, including civilians as well as soldiers, on charges of conspiracy. General Bartha, who had succeeded Tombor as Minister of Defense, denounced the action as grossly illegal and a violation of national dignity. He appointed a committee of generals to institute proceedings against Palfy-Ostereicher. However, even before the committee could meet, General Bartha was summoned to the office of Lt. General Sviridov, the Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission. Sviridov laid his revolver on his desk and said to General Bartha: "It has come to my attention that you have initiated an investigation of General Palfy with the aim of removing him. General Palfy has acted legally against a conspiracy directed at the Hungarian people and the Soviet army. As you can see, there are two telephones on my desk: one is a direct line to your Ministry, the other is a line to the Soviet Secret Police headquarters in Hungary. There are two alternatives. You can call your ministry and break off the investigation of Palfy, or I can call the NKVD and order them to transport the 93 prisoners to Siberia."

General Bartha replied, "You have the gun," picked up the telephone and called Lt. General Laszlo Kuthy⁹ at the Ministry of Defense, ordering him to call off the action against Palfy. Kuthy, in reply, informed General Bartha that Palfy had not even bothered to appear before the investigating committee.

As General Bartha was leaving Sviridov's office he met Palfy in the anteroom. Palfy handed him a letter from General Sviridov—in whose presence he had just been—containing the following order signed by Sviridov in the name of the Allied Control Commission: "In my capacity as Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission I hereby order that, for the protection of the Soviet army, the Hungarian military-security department be removed from the jurisdiction of the Minister of Defense and placed under the authority of the Allied Control Commission. The order will remain in effect until the military-security department has completed the investigation of the conspiracy against the Soviet army."

This was a flagrant violation of all humane principles and of the stipulations of the Peace Treaty. The Communists and their Soviet masters were moving with dogged determination toward their goal, the complete subjugation of the country and the ruthless elimination—by murder if necessary—of all who stood in their way. First they impoverished the country and then they enslaved it. General Bartha realized that his hands were tied, and therefore a few weeks after the above episode he resigned as Minister of Defense and later went into exile.

Nevertheless, if the terror mounted steadily so did the spirit of resistance. As the only occupying force in Hun-

⁹ General Kuthy had been active in the underground anti-Nazi movement during the war, and he was in contact with the West. After the war, though not a Communist, he held various high posts: first as Inspector of the Army and later as a Deputy Minister of Defense. In 1950 he was arrested and kept in prison until the October Revolt. After the Revolt he was rearrested.



General Albert Bartha, Minister of Defense, 1946-47, who valiantly opposed Sovietization of the Hungarian armed forces. He is now in exile in the United States.

Free Europe Press Photo

gary, the Soviets were in absolute control. Members of the Smallholders' Party and other patriots in the Ministry of Defense did all they could to keep alive a democratic spirit and patriotic feeling, hoping that this might offset the activities of the Communist-controlled Ministry of Interior and the Security Police. But the heroic struggle was doomed almost from the outset. The Soviets kept a watchful eye on the slightest move within the army. Appointment to the smallest position and the acquisition of any equipment or arms were subject to approval by the Soviet representatives on the Control Commission. Even though the transfer of forces to the frontier guards in the summer of 1946 had practically maimed the rest of the Hungarian army, the Soviets and the Communist leadership did not yet consider the situation safe. On September 15, 1947, the Peace Treaty took effect. This meant that the Control Commission had to leave the country and that the Soviets lost direct influence over the Hungarian army. This influence had to be replaced by control from within the country, which was achieved by Communist political penetration. The period during which this process took place lasted from the fall of 1947 to the fall of 1948.

Enter Mihaly Farkas

AFTER THE RESIGNATION of General Bartha as Minister of Defense the office was held by Lajos Dinnyes of the Smallholders' Party. But after the 1947 elections the job was given to Peter Veres,¹⁰ the leader of the Peasant Party. Veres had no knowledge of military affairs and no interest in them, while his weakness and his willingness to collaborate with the Communists made him incapable of

¹⁰ Peter Veres is an eminent writer. As the leader of the Peasant Party after the war he collaborated with the Communists. But he opposed the collectivization of agriculture, and in 1955 and 1956 he was among the writers whose criticisms of the regime were the prelude to the October Revolt.

defending the army's interests. The real head of the army was now General Palfy, who in the summer of 1947 became Lt. General, and was afterward appointed by Veres Inspector of the Army. The nefarious work of the Soviet staff in the Control Commission was now taken over by the three generals Palfy, Illy and Solyom, who enforced complete hegemony for the Communists over all branches of the Hungarian army. By this time there was no longer any need for secrecy, and Solyom openly admitted his adherence to the Communists. It now became possible and practicable for the Communists to develop the army along their own lines, the first step being the opening of the Kosuth Army Academy in the building of the former Ludovika Academy in Budapest, in the fall of 1947. Command of the new academy was given to General Kalman Revay, who had previously posed as a non-party man but now admitted his Communist affiliation.

Kalman Revay graduated from the Ludovika Academy in 1934 and became a cavalry officer. He painted frescoes of saints in the chapel of the Ludovika Academy, for which



This memorial to the 1848 Freedom Fighters stands in the compound of the royal fortress in Buda, on the right bank of the Danube. General Kiraly describes how, even under the Communists, it remained a focal point of Hungarian national sentiment.

Photo from *Budapest Szobrai*, Kepzomuveszeti Alap Kiadovallalata, 1955



The Soviet memorial on top of Gellert Mountain in Buda designed by the noted Hungarian sculptor Zsigmond Kisfaludy Strobl. General Kiraly refers to this monument in the article. According to the author Strobl had been commissioned by Admiral Miklos Horthy to design a memorial for Horthy's son, killed in the Second World War. When Soviet Marshal Voroshilov saw the monument, about to be completed, he had it changed to a Soviet memorial. During the Revolt the demonstrators removed the secondary figure of the Soviet soldier and shot down the red star, but left the statue itself intact.

Photo from *Budapest Szobrai*, Kepzomuveszeti Alap Kiadovallalata, 1955

the Pope awarded him the decoration "Pro ecclesia et pontifice." After the war he joined the Communist Party. In 1950 he was arrested and hanged.

In September 1948 extensive celebrations were planned for the hundredth anniversary of the Hungarian freedom fight of 1848. This was to be the first large-scale military ceremony and I was held responsible for its success. In spite of the growing Communist domination we prepared for the celebration in high spirits. Large delegations came to Hungary from neighboring countries. Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, Bulgarians, Albanians, the peoples of Eastern Europe, prepared for the festivities with genuine enthusiasm. Up to that time very satisfactory relations had developed with neighboring countries, including exchanges of delegations and the organization of international sports events. We even thought, with hopeful optimism, of a future "Fed-

eration of the Danube Basin" which had been one of the dreams of Lajos Kossuth, the leader of the 1848 Freedom Fighters. Into this festive atmosphere fell a new blow. The announcement came that Peter Veres had been removed as Minister of Defense and replaced by Mihaly Farkas, one of the top four Communists, and that Farkas would be the speaker at the celebration.

Mihaly Farkas was a Czechoslovak citizen and printer by trade, who had served in the Czechoslovak army. As a Communist political officer he had worked in Spain in the international brigade. He had been responsible for the execution of several dissident Communists there, among them the Hungarian Mate Zalka, an outstanding military leader. He divorced his wife in France because she was not a faithful Stalinist, and later went to Moscow, where he became an NKVD officer. In this capacity he returned to Hungary after the war. He and his son Vladimir, the secret police officer, were notorious agents of the terror under Rakosi. In April 1957 he was sentenced to 16 years in prison by the Kadar regime.

We were stunned at this move, knowing its significance. We managed to find a little consolation in a symbolic demonstration of our sentiments, which we expressed in the way the celebration was carried out. For after a brief pause at the Soviet War Memorial we proceeded to the memorial erected in honor of the heroes of 1848, where the main part of the celebration took place. It was a celebration which has not been equalled since, openly honoring the memory of the 1848 Freedom Fighters. Since then increasing Soviet pressure has operated to obscure the Hungarian national traditions. The festivity was also the last expression of the heightened friendliness with neighboring countries. At that time they still felt they could overcome the differences that had sprung from past conflicts and were ready to extend a friendly hand. But afterward new barriers arose under Soviet direction. Barbed wire and mine fields were installed physically on the western frontier and figuratively on other frontiers. Communication between Hungary and her neighbors became even more difficult than in times when they had been in open conflict with each other.

So it was Mihaly Farkas who addressed the festive gathering. His address bore the marks of all Communist speeches; it was uninspired, doctrinaire and full of threats. In addition it contained the following very significant statement: "The officers' corps, and the general staff as well, must be expanded to include the best members of the working class. . . ." This statement marked the beginning of a new era in the life of the Hungarian army.

Our interpretation of Farkas' statement was that workers and peasants would be enrolled in military schools and taught the art of soldiering. We were agreeable to this, supposing that in time they would acquire knowledge and wisdom, and that by steady application some of them would eventually become worthy leaders of the army. But we were gravely mistaken. The Communists proceeded to fill high military posts with ruthless Muscovites who lacked knowledge and never became worthy of their positions. Without the slightest formal military training or education, assistant printer Mihaly Farkas became General of the

Army; ironworker Sandor Nogradi and streetcar conductor Istvan Batta became generals; Istvan Szabo, agitator, Karoly Janza, clerk, Mihaly Szalvay, bricklayer, became lieutenant generals; Bela Szekely, teacher, Berecz, assistant baker, Tibor Berczelli, electrician, Mihaly Horvath and many other such, became major generals.

Political Officers

IN ADDITION, FARKAS INTRODUCED certain Soviet procedures which were completely alien and senseless to us. One of the first drastic changes was the conversion of the Orientation Officers' Corps into the Political Officers' Corps (see note 5). A political officer was assigned to each commander on every level down to company commanders. This meant that every order issued by a commander took effect only when it had been countersigned by the political officer. In case of disagreement the matter was referred to the next commander and his political officer. But the secret order governing the relationship between military commanders and political officers gave the final authority to the political officer. I remember its wording exactly, since I had to repeat it many times to my junior officers: "If there is disagreement between the military commander and the political officer and reasons of urgency or other circumstances prevent the opinion of the next higher commander and political officer from being obtained, the position of the political officer must be accepted. This is particularly so in matters of border violations and incidents requiring the use of arms."

The political officer was a member of the army having equal rights with the commander he was assigned to, and at the same time he was a representative of the Communist Party within the army. Thus through the institution of the Political Officers' Corps the Communist Party secured its hold over the army. This is plain enough and easy to understand. Yet the full significance of the political officer's role became clear to me only in 1949 when General Sergei Sergeievich Sergei, Chief Soviet Political Adviser to the Hungarian armed forces, invited some thirty leading officers to see him in the Ministry of Defense. He offered to answer questions. One of the questions posed by the Hungarians concerned the role of the political officers. In the course of his reply the Soviet general said:

"Moved by their impotent rage, Western imperialists lash out at the Soviet system of political officers. They charge that the political officers simply murder the soldiers and demand the performance of impossible tasks. This is a lie. I myself was a political officer during the whole war. At Stalingrad I was political officer of the army and member of the war council. But during the whole war I shot only five Soviet soldiers, and all of them deserved it."

My God, I thought, this man simply executed five of his own soldiers. Under the shock of this monstrosity I felt sick. He noticed it and asked me, "Do you feel ill?" I answered that I did. Now, however, I fully understood the purpose of the Political Officers' Corps. The Corps was headed by Lt. General Sandor Nogradi.



"People's [Hungarian] Army" on parade. Cadets in postwar, pre-Soviet type uniform. *Beke es Szabadsag* (Budapest), March 1, 1951



Propaganda photo showing members of the so-called Soviet "Liberation Army" fraternizing with Hungarian civilians.
Nok Lapja (Budapest), April 4, 1951



Typical propaganda photo showing a Hungarian soldier subscribing to the "Peace Loan," formerly a form of compulsory additional taxation. The picture dramatizes the use of the army by the Party as an instrument of its policies.
Beke es Szabadsag (Budapest), October 5, 1952

Nogradi was a close friend of Mihaly Farkas, having been a political officer with him in the Spanish Civil War, where he had learned the enforcement of discipline according to the methods of General Sergei. As long as Farkas and Nogradi were fighting for control over Hungary and its army, they supported each other through thick and thin, but as soon as they had attained their goal they became rivals. In 1950 Farkas managed, with the aid of his Moscow contacts, to engineer the arrest of Nogradi on charges of treason. He had eight other men prepared to admit having acted as contacts between Nogradi and western imperialists. It seemed that Nogradi had come to the end of his career. However, he had contacts of his own in Moscow and, taking fast action, they saved his neck. This did not prevent the secret police from sentencing the other eight men to six years in jail, nor did Nogradi do anything to help those men. He is now Kadar's ambassador in Peiping.

Soviet Advisers

AS SOON AS FARKAS became Minister of Defense, staff officers were informed that the "Glorious Soviet Army" was prepared to give still further assistance to its Hungarian ally. The Soviets had offered to place their "victorious arms" at the disposal of the Hungarian army, and at the same time to send "advisers" to teach the army how to use these "victorious arms" as well as methods of combat and leadership. The Hungarian army was expected to receive this news with jubilant enthusiasm.

Soon large quantities of Soviet arms began to arrive in Hungary. The country paid heavily for them: the whole lot was billed as brand new, despite the fact that 20-30 percent of them were worn out and quite useless. Moreover, old and new items were all mixed together. When we protested we were told that since the worn-out weapons would be used only for training purposes the quality did not matter. This was the end of the question. The Soviet weapons were very primitive in their finish as compared to Hungarian models, but they were usable. They were cleverly constructed with very few parts, which made them easy to handle. They did not get dirty easily and they stood up very well under adverse conditions, particularly in freezing temperatures. They were accurate in performance and, on the whole, easy to handle. Their design showed no regard for human comfort and no postwar modernization. Until the time of my arrest in August 1951 there were no shipments of new models. Rocket weapons were conspicuously lacking, and even at the time of the October Revolt there were no modern anti-tank rockets. Thus the arms supplied to Hungary were obsolete by current standards.

In 1948 Soviet advisers came to Hungary to teach the handling of these old-fashioned arms. The employment of these "advisers" is perhaps the most typical method of Soviet penetration, and its examination would prove most profitable for those who are not fully acquainted with these methods. The first advisers arrived in November 1948 with Lt. General Prokoffief at their head. An adviser was assigned to each branch of the army, to the infantry officers' school and to the staff officers course. All but one

or two of them had been advisers to the Chinese Nationalists during World War II in Chunking. Some of them wore a huge flower-like decoration they had received from Chiang Kai-shek. Their smooth, diplomatic manner was a pleasant surprise. "You are the commanders," they said, "it is your army and we are only advisers. We are here to tell you how we do things, but you know your own conditions and you should take from us only what you think is right. All we want to do is help you." They gave us Russian military manuals which we had translated into Hungarian, and on the basis of these we prepared instructions of our own.

This continued until the fall of 1949 when all the advisers were recalled to be replaced by new ones. We learned that Lt. Gen. Prokoffief had been promoted to command of the Kiev military district. Such a position exists in every army and is always considered a great honor, welcomed even by the soldiers' wives. But in this case Mrs. Prokoffief cried bitter tears at the thought of going home from Hungary. She had grown accustomed to a better standard of life, more comfort, better clothes, and beauty shops, and she complained to her Hungarian interpreter, a woman: "All I have will be taken from me on the border. I shall have to wear coarse stockings and work hard. I would rather die here than go back."

Nevertheless they left, and others came in their place headed this time by Lt. General Bojko. By that time Yugoslavia had broken with the Soviet Union, and Hungary had become an important Soviet military base. The Communist Party now openly ruled the country and it set out to shape the army to fit the Soviet requirements. These new advisers, unlike their predecessors, were not smooth diplomats but ruthless, zealous Bolsheviks who did not disguise their function. All military regulations that were not exact replicas of the Soviet regulations were destroyed and replaced by literal translations. Every word was checked, and woe befell anyone guilty of the slightest deviation from the letter. Commanders were removed at the slightest excuse. The whole army was remodelled, even to its outward appearance. The soldiers were trained to move, stand and salute exactly as did Russian soldiers. The small Hungarian barrack rooms holding 10 to 15 men were changed to hold 200 in the Soviet style. While eating habits vary among countries according to local requirements, the Russians disregarded this and insisted that Russian eating methods be introduced. The Soviets did not seem to notice the growing hatred of their advisers and the stimulus this gave to hatred of the USSR.

The advisers looked into our most personal affairs with suspicious curiosity, while at the same time they allowed us to know nothing of their own existence. They kept strictly to themselves, had separate living quarters, clubs, movies and social activities. After working hours they simply disappeared. Except at official receptions the public never saw the Soviet advisers. They did not want to be seen and observed, and clearly they were not supposed to see too much of the western way of life themselves.

The Russian uniform was introduced in the Hungarian army in 1951, after I had been arrested, but even before



The slogan above the group reads "Long Live April 4, the 7th Anniversary Of Our Country's Liberation!" On the stand are (from left to right): Zoltan Vas (partly hidden), formerly a top Communist economist; Istvan Hidas, former Politburo member, now member of the Central Committee; dictator Matyas Rakosi; Jan Harus (at back), Czechoslovak delegate; Marshal Voroshilov, once head of the Allied Commission and Hungary's Soviet viceroy; Mihaly Farkas (with raised arm) a key figure in the rape of the army; and a Chinese delegate.

Beke es Szabadsag (Budapest), April 13, 1952

that time, while I was still free, I was ordered by Farkas to have the troops wear the Russian uniform for a dress parade in Budapest in 1951. Just before the parade I supervised a dress rehearsal. When Farkas ordered me to give my report, that humorless, ruthless Muscovite allowed himself a joke. It was the only time I ever heard him make such a remark. "Tell me," he said, "when the parade is over isn't it likely that someone may ask: 'Where are the Hungarian troops?'" I answered, "That is quite possible." His face clouded. I could see he was embarrassed at having permitted himself to utter exactly what was in his mind.

The Soviet advisers tried to rob the army of its national character, to change every single aspect of it—organization, spirit, clothing, equipment, etc.—into those of a Satellite army, with the ultimate aim of making it an organic part of the Soviet army. Once Colonel Voloshin, a hero of the Soviet Union and our strategic adviser, came to me excitedly waving a training bulletin. "Look at this, your Academy is engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda," he said. The bulletin showed a division ready for attack, deployed in the best Soviet fashion.

"Where is there any anti-Soviet propaganda?" I said with real astonishment.

"Can't you see?" he thundered.

"No, I can't."

"Well, look at this. The division is facing the east, ready

to attack, and only the Soviet Union is east of Hungary."

I could not resist smiling. At this the Soviet officer threw the bulletin on the floor and stomped out of the room.

Two days later a similar episode occurred. This time he came to me with the first-year curriculum in military geography. In it I had designated as "possible battle areas" the territory of Hungary and all of the surrounding area to a radius of about 600 or 700 miles. This brought a small strip of Soviet territory into the outline. Colonel Voloshin was even angrier than on the previous occasion. "The Soviet Union can never become a battle area. And anyhow, Hungary has only one enemy: Yugoslavia. Consequently the only military geography you need to teach is that of Yugoslavia. Every soldier should know that in detail."

"I am not willing," I replied, "to train the future staff officers of the Hungarian army for only one eventuality. Hungarian staff officers must have a universal knowledge in every field, including that of military geography." I was no longer able to conceal my irritation.

He left the room and never came again. After my arrest two months later I learned that everything I have ever said to him was recorded verbatim in the secret police files, and on the basis of that testimony I was sentenced to death. It is possible that our conversations were recorded by a hidden

microphone in my office, or perhaps Colonel Voloshin had an excellent memory. Probably both suppositions are correct.

Soviet Advisers During the Revolt

THE NUMBER OF ADVISERS reached its peak in the year 1953. By that time they were assigned to each principal department of the Ministry of Defense, each department of the military school and to every single military unit. The size of this invasion is illustrated by the fact that even while I was still in command of the Officers' Academy, before the influx had reached its peak, our Russian advisers included one general, one high-ranking political officer and 13 colonels. After Imre Nagy's government took office in 1953 the number of advisers began to decline because Hungarian officers who had been sent to Moscow for training began to return. These officers were considered by the Party to be absolutely trustworthy and reliable, thus reducing the need for large numbers of Soviet advisers. That period also inaugurated a change in the the activities of the advisers. Whereas previously they had done most of the planning, commanding and organizing, they then began to restrict their activities to supervision. At the beginning of the October Revolt it was the advisers who instructed the Defense Minister and high officers to issue terroristic orders, including the order to open fire. The advisers made certain that the orders were carried out.

During the first days of the Revolt they realized that they were in trouble. Their last effective order was to scatter the units of the Hungarian army, beginning on October 24. For example, one infantry regiment from the Kaposvar division was sent to Budapest, while a motorized unit was sent somewhere else and all the artillery was left in Kaposvar. The same thing happened to other divisions. Their aim was to make organized resistance against the Soviet forces difficult or impossible.

But between October 23 and October 28 the Freedom Fighters defeated Soviet units in the Battle of Budapest. A

truce was signed between the Hungarian and Soviet forces on condition that Soviet troops withdraw from Hungary. On October 29, 1956, at 8:55 p.m., Radio Kossuth broadcast the first official statement that the replacement of Soviet troops by Hungarian units had begun. This meant the end of the advisers' function, since they had no place in the army of a free country. Without the support of Soviet tanks and arms this sort of "advising" was no longer feasible.

As the Soviet troops withdrew from Budapest their tanks were followed by the automobiles of the advisers, loaded with jewelry, furs and other valuables. Whole sections of Budapest, along Vilma Kiralyne Avenue (Gorki Allee) and Stefania Setany (Voroshilov Avenue)—the most luxurious and exclusive parts of the city—were deserted when the advisers departed from Budapest. On the night of November 1 a number of planes left from Debrecen and other airports carrying the advisers and their families and their loot.

When the control of the advisers ended on October 28-29, the first order issued by the revolutionary organs truly reflected the desires of the Hungarian people: that the bloodshed cease and the army be forbidden to use its weapons against the Hungarian people. Other significant and symbolic changes were the abolition of the hated term "comrade" and its replacement by the more intimate address of "fellow soldier," in keeping with Hungarian tradition, and the return of the Kossuth coat of arms in place of the Communist crest.

The Soviet advisers had instilled strife, discontent and terror in Hungary. Their departure marked the revival of the Hungarian spirit and the expression of the people's will. But the relief was short-lived, because on November 4 the Soviets intervened again. With the installation of Kadar's puppet regime a new wave of terror and Soviet colonialism began, more ruthless than before, and soon the Soviet military advisers returned. Now they rule in Hungary once more.



Bulgarian Writers' Revolt

A Review of the Latest Literary Controversy

A STORM IN BULGARIAN LITERARY circles has been gathering force. The Bulgarian writers have not gone as far as their Polish and Hungarian colleagues in the pre-revolutionary ferment of 1955-56. But for the past eighteen months they have been evincing the same kind of disillusionment, protest, and obduracy. The Bulgarian dissidents have attacked on two planes: in the context of their writings they show the Party and regime as morally and politically bankrupt; and in their statements at meetings and discussions, they censure the regime leadership, deny the Party's right to control the arts, and denounce "Socialist realism." Their protest is by no means only a literary one: after the 1956 April Plenum which demoted former Premier Vulko Chervenkov, they demanded an extraordinary Party Congress to carry the "liberal" program of the 20th Soviet Party Congress further than the regime had shown itself willing to go. Their iconoclastic views were aired in the press and in "clubs" and private rendezvous whose exact character is not revealed by the censored press, but which seem to bear a family resemblance to the revolutionary intelligentsia clubs of Poland and Hungary. And just as in Poland and Hungary, it is the Party members among the writers who have taken the lead in criticizing Stalinists in the hierarchy.

In the past six months Party pressure has steadily mounted against the dissident "révisionists." It reached a climax at a special session of the Party organization of the Writers' Union held at the end of November. The results were so inconclusive and politically so damaging that the regime press delayed mention of the meeting for almost a month. As reported in *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), December 26, 1957, the meeting clearly exposed an open schism between the Party leadership and a crystallized writers' opposition.

Historical Background

THIS BELATED OUTBREAK of the moral and intellectual fever which swept Poland and Hungary two years ago strikingly demonstrates its infectiousness. The course of the Bulgarian revolt in fact closely parallels the course of events in Hungary in 1955, when, under the "hard-line" Rakosi rule, a rebellion against Party strictures took form under the leadership of Communist writers Gyula Hay and Tibor Dery. A March 1955 Hungarian Party resolution severely attacked the "bourgeois revisionist" trend develop-

ing among writers, but the dissidents refused to capitulate. At a Writers' Union meeting the following November a bloc of leading Communist authors threatened to resign their Union posts and drafted a defiant memorandum to the Party Central Committee. The 20th Soviet Congress resolutions in February 1956 strengthened the position of the Hungarian dissidents; in March they were clamoring for the ouster of Rakosi, and in the following months they became the vanguard of the ill-fated Revolt.

The key figures in the Bulgarian writers' rebellion are Emil Manov, Todor Genov, Lyuben Stanev, Stoyan Daskalov, Lyudmil Stoyanov: all, except Stanev, Party members. In late 1956 and early 1957 these and other writers pub-



Andrey Gulyashki, the Secretary of the Party organization of the Writers' Union and the major speaker at its tumultuous November 1957 meeting.

Sketch from *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), December 30, 1954

lished a number of plays, novels and short stories which painted a black picture of life in their country and depicted the Party apparatus as a haven for corrupt, self-seeking bureaucrats. The main outlet for their work was the literary periodical *Plamuk*, started by the Writers' Union at the beginning of 1957. But it found its way also into the pages of *Literaturen Front*, the established and generally orthodox Writers' Union organ, and into other periodicals.

Landmarks in this new literature are Todor Genov's play "Fear," published in *Teater*, January 1957, which portrays a once high-minded Communist who rises in the Party and is corroded by lust for power; "The Benefactors," by P. Nesnakomov (*Plamuk*, No. 2, 1957), which describes the exploitation of poor by rich in present-day Communist society; Pavel Vezhinov's play "My Secret" (*Septemvri*, December 1956), in which one of the characters goes so far as to claim that "the most perfect morality is that which least constrains people and offers them the greatest opportunity of being free and happy." The novel "An Unauthentic Case" by Emil Manov centers around a situation in which a higher Party organization autocratically overrules a lower Party unit's decision in connection with the expulsion of one of its members. Stanev's novel "The Laskov Family,"—compared by one critic to Ehrenburg's "The Thaw"—recounts the degradation of a father and son, both Communists who regard the Party merely as a source of personal gain. But the work's significant feature is its sympathetic characterization of the uncle who, on the basis of his past and social origin, would be considered (from an orthodox Communist viewpoint) an irredeemable class enemy. A short story by Kiril Toromanski, "Anna, the Comrade of the District" (*Literaturen Front*, July 18, 1957; see *East Europe*, January 1958, pp 37-42), describes how a sincere Party worker is forced out of her job by a regional Party Secretary who is a petty tyrant. The Party organization is pictured as completely out of touch with the peasants in its own district. The story was immediately denounced as libel of the Lom County and Vratsa District Party apparatus, and *Literaturen Front* condemned for its "crude political error" in publishing "this reportage" (*Narodna Tribuna* [Lom], August 3).

Socialist Realism Infringed

If the development of the Bulgarian ferment was analogous to events in Hungary and Poland, its artistic inspiration was more visibly Soviet. Bulgarian literature is historically and culturally closer to Russia than that of the other countries in the area, and in the current ferment Dudintsev's novel "Not by Bread Alone" has been frequently cited. The new Bulgarian writing dwelt on the psychological complexity and ambiguity in human character, striking a note of deep pessimism and fatalism; and in this way, in addition to its political criticism, it departed from the doctrine of Socialist realism which prescribes an "optimistic objectivity" in the literary approach to life.

In discussions on literary theory conducted throughout 1957 and reported mainly in *Plamuk*, Emil Manov, one of *Plamuk*'s editors, emerged as the most outspoken rebel against the doctrine of Socialist realism and Party domina-



Todor Genov, the unrepentant author of the violently denounced play "Fear."

Sketch from *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), December 30, 1954

tion of artistic creation. Manov denied the official contention that Socialist realism embraced a wide variety of possible trends, and held that the writer should have not only a choice of methods but also of ideological positions, provided these latter were basically "democratic." Almost as unorthodox in his statements was Lyudmil Stoyanov, a Communist writer of long standing and good repute in the Party. Stoyanov claimed that, in order to observe artistic truth, the writer might sometimes have to depart from the Party line. In opposition to the most cherished tenets of official dogma, he went so far as to advocate a separation of art from politics. Yet another writer, Boris Delchev, was a particularly violent critic of Socialist realism, coining the term "revolutionary realism" for the proposed new literature.

Hierarchy Counteracts

DURING THE FIRST PART of 1957 this new literature not only passed censorship but drew no critical reaction from official quarters after its publication. Previously, throughout 1955 and 1956 the orthodox (pro-Chervenkov) faction of the Party and Writers' Union had made spasmodic and unsuccessful attempts to rein in the restive writers. In December 1955 Chervenkov, then Premier, made a speech denouncing "bourgeois manifestations" in the Writers' Union, scoring alleged concentrated attacks and demands for a change in the Chervenkov-dominated Union leadership. The former Premier's eclipse between April 1956 and the Spring of 1957 gave the writers an interval during which the "revisionist" movement took on substance and coherence.

After the Hungarian cataclysm, and the general "battening down" which followed throughout the Soviet bloc, the orthodox faction began to exercise stronger and steadier pressure on the writers, with Chervenkov now occupying the post of Minister of Culture, and Todor Pavlov, a leading theoretician, head of the Academy of Sciences, and a stalwart Stalinist, leading the attack. Pavlov, crusading for a revival of the Zhdanovist theses, directed a Bulgarian campaign in the spring of 1957 against Polish, Hungarian and particularly Yugoslav "revisionist" intellectuals. A feud developed between Pavlov and two Yugoslav writers, Dusan Kostic and M. Djukic, who took the part of the Bulgarian "revisionist" writers against Pavlov. In *Polityka* (Belgrade), April 28, 1957, Kostic derided the "utilitarian" attitude of Pavlov toward the arts. He said that, in regard to Lyudmil Stoyanov's "dangerous" thesis that art should be independent of Party politics, the "hardcore dogmatists," instead of getting angry at this, would do better to ask themselves "where the origin of this conflict between artistic and Party truth lies." Kostic commended Stoyanov's refusal to withdraw from his position, and commented dryly: "Nothing could have been more amazing for Pavlov than Stoyanov's stubbornness." Djukic, writing in *Knjizevne Novine* (Belgrade), May 1, said: "The method of Socialist realism is slowly but steadily being transformed into a method of pressure upon artists . . . Todor Pavlov . . . has gone even farther [than former Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov]. . . . He denies to everyone with a different opinion not only the right to create but even to think. . . ."

In July 1957 the arch-Stalinist Pavlov was promoted to full membership in the Bulgarian Party Central Committee, thus scoring at least a local victory in the skirmish between "liberals" and "conservatives" throughout the bloc.

The post-Hungary drive to reinforce Party unity throughout the bloc resulted in the July 1957 purge of First Deputy Premier Georgi Chankov, Yonko Panov and Dobri Terpeshev from the Bulgarian Party leadership. At about the same time a regular session of the Writers' Union was held, at which "revisionism" among the members was sharply condemned. According to *Literaturen Front*'s report of the meeting in its July 18 issue,* the writers were accused of misrepresenting the errors caused by the cult of personality (the current euphemism for the evils of Stalinism) as fundamental policies of the Party, of misquoting Lenin in support of their ideas of artistic freedom, and "under the guise of the struggle against dogmatism, refuting Socialist realism in a most dogmatic manner." In sum, they were accused of disseminating anti-Party views under the slogan of supporting the program mapped out at the 20th Soviet Party Congress. It was in this article that the writers' demand for an extraordinary Party session, made exactly a year previously, was first reported in the Bulgarian press.

Khrushchev's unequivocal reassertion of Party authority over Soviet writers (*Pravda*, August 29) lent weight to the "hard-line" faction. Now the lines were drawn for a running battle between the orthodox members of the Party leadership and the dissident writers. Increasingly attacks and counter-attacks assumed a political cast. In the autumn of 1957 a number of articles in the Party press reiterated with great emphasis the doctrine of Socialist realism and the leading role of the Party in literature as absolute first principles.

Lines Drawn

THE WRITERS ANSWERED the intimidation with a "silence strike"—similar to that of the Hungarian revolutionary writers under Kadar, and provoking the Party to new heights of indignation. The October 17 issue of *Literaturen Front* railed at this "tactic" and threatened the Party writers. The article reviewed the course of the debate on literary matters begun after the 20th Soviet Party Congress, and said that although the debate had disappeared (evidently on orders) from the press, it was continuing in meetings, "sometimes sharply, sometimes quietly, and recently with a persistent silence." The article charged that the "irreconcilable [writers]" were using silence as a form of arguing: "It is not a question of writers being passive and aloof out of private reasons, but of exploiting 'silence' as a means of opposing Party views on literature. These writers are not really silent at all; on the contrary, they are very talkative and 'heroic,' when they speak from their own rostrums, over a glass of wine in homes, in the two clubs [unspecified] and certain editorial offices."

Attacking Genov and Manov and their rejection of

* Illustrative of the schizophrenia of the Party press at this time, this was the same issue of *Literaturen Front* which published "Anna, the Comrade of the District," for which the paper was severely upbraided.

criticism, the article complained, "When such authors are told that they do not tell the truth about our life and its heroes in their works and in their statements . . . they assume the tone of 'martyrs' . . . and ask: 'Where is the free struggle of opinions? What has been left of the freedom of artistic creation?'"

The article reminded writers that "everybody is free to write and say what he pleases. . . . However every free union of people, including the Party, is free to expel members who use the Party label to preach anti-Party views. . . . The borderline between what is pro-Party and what is anti-Party will be determined by the Party program, by the tactical Party resolutions and Party statutes . . . This is how things will be in our Party, gentlemen—adherents of bourgeois 'freedom of criticism.'"

In conclusion *Literaturen Front* called for prompt reconstitution of "iron Leninist discipline" among the Communist writers, underscoring that "writers are Party and State workers." It challenged the silent writers to "come out in the open with their charges that the Party has prepared a funeral for the decisions of the 20th Soviet Party Congress."

Manov Under Fire

IN THE OCTOBER 24 issue, Emil Manov wrote in defense of his ideas and of his repeatedly villified novel "An Unauthentic Case." He said that the message he had wanted to convey in "An Unauthentic Case" was simply that "sometimes man is more important than the institution" and that "our theory—that man is the goal for which our society struggles—must not be separated from our practice, even in special cases. . . ." Rather sarcastically, Manov urged that the above lines be accepted by "those of my critics capable of thinking objectively . . . in lieu of a declaration for 'honesty and reliability' which is evidently wanted from me. . . ."

Manov's defense was immediately and thoroughly rejected in a scathing article by S. Karaskosotov, a member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Writers' Union, in *Vecherni Noviny* (Sofia), October 29. According to Karaskosotov, Manov, while insisting that he does not agree with Polish and Yugoslav colleagues who have repudiated Socialist realism, at the same time again casts doubt on the method of Socialist realism. Karaskosotov blasted Manov's "fallacious notion" that it is sufficient for a writer to approach his work from "either Socialist or sincere democratic positions," everything else being left to his personal choice. It is totally inadmissible to proceed from any other than the one—the Communist—position, said Karaskosotov: "So-called democratic positions alone are not enough. . . . A writer does not have to be a Communist, but his position must coincide with the Party position. Party-mindedness is obligatory for Party and non-Party writers alike."

Manov not only argues theoretically against Socialist realism, the article complained; he abandons it in his novel "An Unauthentic Case." A basic Party organization refuses to expel the innocent heroine, but the Party district committee overrules its decision and she is expelled: "What is the moral? The basic Party organization is right,



Left to right: Emil Manov, Pavel Vezhinov, and Stoyan Daskalov. All three are spokesmen of the "writers' opposition" and authors of its most controversial literary works.

Photos from *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), May 16, 1957

but the higher Party organization imposes its unjust decision by force." This tendency, said Karaskosotov, is also the "pet theme" of writers such as Mihail Velichkov and Todor Genov. Social criticism, he said, is valid as a weapon only in the hands of a writer with a clear grasp of the Party line. Manov, however, has described "Freudian types" and turned "falsity into irony" by representing the character of the people's leaders as evil.

More Attacks

A NUMBER OF SUBSEQUENT press articles showed a steady reaffirmation of the Stalin-Zhdanov literary formulas. *Literaturen Front*, November 28, castigated the revisionist authors for dwelling on the mistakes and negative features of Socialist life without pointing out the element of "historical necessity" in these features: "Socialist writers must show that the difficulties which they depict are inherent in the extremely rapid progress of our times. . . . Under the conditions of building Socialism its weak aspects can be described only from the positions of the Party and the working class. . . ."

The article then measured some of the "revisionist" works according to this principle. In the case of Genov's "Fear," the author failed to show the struggle of the Party against weaknesses in the State apparatus and to indicate that the corrupt protagonist lives in a "healthy social atmosphere" which will eventually isolate him as a morbid member of society. In his short story "Svetlin," Serafim Severnyak has portrayed his hero only from "foggy humanitarian positions" and not from the point of view of the interest of the working people. It is essential that Socialist writers show the connection between social conditions and the fate of individuals. "Is it true—as the novel 'An Unauthentic Case' implies—that the only thing which has changed is that some people carry Party membership cards in their pockets, while human tragedies remain the same as in the past?"

One of the characteristics of literary development "during the transition period which began with the Great October Revolution and will end with the Socialist conversion of the last capitalist country on earth" is that art and literature must become increasingly, not less, political: "Deviations from ideological consciousness lead directly to

artistic decadence. Ideological consciousness and political acuteness in our time only add more brilliance to artistic talent and sharpen it just as a file sharpens a knife's point until it gleams."

Party Writers Meet

A MEETING OF THE PARTY organization of the Writers' Union was held on November 29-December 1, 1957, apparently to thrash out the differences between the Party and the dissident writers. The first report on it was published in the December 26 issue of *Literaturen Front*, which devoted four full pages to a transcript of the meeting accompanied by editorial comments strongly supporting the Party positions. (The Yugoslavs demonstrated their continuing interest in the Bulgarian literary controversy by prominently featuring extracts—without comment—from the *Literaturen Front* report in the December 28 issue of *Borba*.)

The orthodox Party leadership was represented at the meeting by Ruben Avramov, member of the Party Central Committee in charge of the section for science, culture and education; and Dimitar Ganev, a Secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo. The main address was made by Andrey Gulyashki, the Secretary of the Writers' Union Party organization; Avramov also spoke briefly.

Gulyashki reviewed in a factual manner the official grievances against the writers. He named ten leading writers in the Party organization who had opposed the Party line. Through their statements and writings these writers, said Gulyashki, had produced "doubt and negation concerning Party policy," which indicated "to put it mildly, an attitude of holding reservations about Socialism."

A particularly disturbing setback to the Party was the evident failure of fourteen years of concentrated Communist indoctrination of the younger generation. From Gulyashki's commentary it is clear that the writers' rebelliousness found a sympathetic echo among the intellectually oriented members of the "progressive youth." The speaker thus had to admit that "some writers and critics, particu-

"The Revisionist"



The man shown cutting up a page of Marx is described as "The Lying Little Fellow." His inspiration is shown as having come from books on the shelf labeled "Revision," "Kautsky," and "Trotsky."

Sturshel (Sofia), March 29, 1957

From "Fear," by Todor Genov

A CHARACTER called "the witness with the flowers" appears before the curtain and recites the following verses:

"Lead me, Party, lead me, I am ready to sacrifice all,
Send me abroad if you wish, even there I will answer
your call,
I am your son, and if you wish you may make me a
Minister,
With flowers I will adorn every home, happy days will
flow,
Only give me an office and a throne and I will repay
you a hundredfold."

According to the criticism in the Party press, this was an obvious parody of a paean "To the Party," by Khristo Radevski, a prominent conformist Communist writer.

Later in the play, the hero looks appraisingly at his friend, a Communist functionary, and says: "Modest, good-natured, nice—to some, jokes; to some, favors; to others, a gift of nylon stockings from Paris. A big, watching spider! . . . Forgive me. You and I are caught in a spider's web. Let us see who will get us out. . . . This spider's web is the Central Committee. . . ." (Teater [Sofia], January 1957)

larly those of the younger generation, wave in an inspired manner the banner of petty bourgeois liberalism, and flirt with their 'courage' to cast doubt on the method of Socialist realism." In view of the part played by students and intellectual youth in the Polish and Hungarian ferment this must appear to the Bulgarian regime an ominous sign indeed.

Gulyashki deplored also the passivity of non-dissident Communist writers who had failed to act against the dissidents, and the complicity of editors and critics who supported the revisionist movement. He charged that the editorial offices of literary publications were overflowing with works which instill in readers "misgivings about Socialism."

Political Demands

Gocho Gochev, chief editor of the periodical *Teater*, and literary critic Mihail Velichkov were condemned for having published and favorably reviewed Genov's play "Fear." Velichkov was also criticized for statements that the Central Committee "petrified" creative work and that literary criticism should be independent of the Party. According to Gulyashki, in October 1956 Velichkov accused the Bulgarian Party leadership of lagging behind the other Soviet bloc Parties in rectifying its mistakes, and called for a reopening of the case of Traicho Kostov, who had been executed as a national Communist. Velichkov had cited the rehabilitation of Rajk in Hungary, and had commended its effects. Two days after he made this statement, Gulyashki pointed out, the Hungarian "counterrevolution" broke out.

In regard to the Hungarian Revolution, Gulyashki

charged that "some Comrades also approved the Polish-Hungarian experience, criticized the Soviet Army for taking part in crushing the Hungarian counterrevolution, and so on. . . ."

A serious new accusation levelled against the writers at the meeting was the allegation that they had criticized the policy of forced collectivization in the villages. The regime is highly sensitive to any criticism of its agrarian program; and in its dedication to the goal of total collectivization—now 85 percent complete—the regime has retained the use of methods which have been dropped from the collectivization policy of Poland and Hungary. *Rabotnicheskoye Delo*, November 23, complained that "unfortunately at meetings and discussions some writers show an irresponsible and unexpected compassion for the peasants. Isn't this compassion hypocritical and based on a profound ignorance of the processes of our development?" Velichkov and Boris Delchev were named at the meeting as having accused the Central Committee of "following a wrong line on collectivization of farms."

It was evidently the Party's intention to put a definitive end at this meeting to the protracted controversy among writers on the value, and exact nature, of Socialist realism. "Among the Communist writers there is no place for disputes for or against Socialist realism," Gulyashki declared. *Literaturen Front*, in its editorial, maintained that "rejection of Socialist realism is a rejection of the Revolution and of Socialist society," that the Hungarian "events" had clearly shown this connection. *Literaturen Front* warned that the revisionist writers, with their attacks on "dogmatism," had been providing grist for the Western propaganda mills. In the Western capitalist countries, said the paper, "dogmatism is shown as the essence of the Socialist State system, and in literature as the essence of Socialist realism." Deliberately or inadvertently, the home denouncers of Socialist realism contribute to the support of this line, although they resent being reminded of this. The paper's editorial scored the writer Panteley Zarev for arguing in his statement at the meeting that "it is dogmatism, not petty bourgeois ideology, which brings forth revisionism" both in literature and politics. Gocho Gochev was accused of holding the similar view that "in our country the danger of dogmatism is greater than the danger of revisionism." Such outright contradiction of the tenet laid down in the November Moscow "Socialist Commonwealth" declaration that revisionism constituted the main threat to present-day Communism was, of course, bitterly scourged by the *Literaturen Front* editorial.

"Even the non-Communists Are Shocked"

Gulyashki berated the Party writers, who, he said, are an overwhelming majority in the leadership of the Writers' Union and are responsible for the listlessness of Union activity. As for their Party activity, he said, lack of unity on the basic ideological questions had seriously disrupted Party unity: "There are Party members who declare that they are not going to obey the majority's decisions, which is obligatory under Party statute . . . [and] members who



Panteley Zarev who, against official dogma, stressed that the main danger came not from "revisionism" but from "dogmatism."

Sketch from *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), December 30, 1954

do not carry out the decisions of the . . . higher Party organs."

The poet Krum Penev was particularly attacked at the meeting for flouting the Party. According to a quoted statement by writer Georgi Karaslavov, Penev not only denounces the Party at meetings but he "submits to the editorial offices of the journal *Septemvri* poems so anti-Party that even the non-Communist editors are shocked."

Pencho Danchev, a Secretary of the Writers' Union, said that the leadership of both the Writers' Union and its Party organization had been inadequate in the period following the 20th Soviet Party Congress, which he attributed to the effects of "certain differences and contradictions between the members of the Party organization Secretariat." That Danchev himself had been one of the trouble-makers was charged in *Literaturen Front's* comment on his "self-criticism" at the meeting: "[Danchev] preferred to pass over in silence the fact that not only had he assumed a liberal attitude toward the errors of the Comrades . . . but he actually encouraged and supported these errors." Two other Secretaries of the Union, Mladen Isaev and Lamar, were also criticized at the meeting for their failure to take a stand against the dissidents.

Gulyashki's address was moderate in tone, but he warned the dissidents that the Party's patience was not "limitless." He hinted at a possible "reorganization" in the leadership of the writers' organization.

Gulyashki's own position in the controversy is, at this point, quite ambiguous. Although at the meeting he spoke in his official capacity as Secretary of the Party organization, Gulyashki is also the chief editor of *Plamuk*, in which most of the criticized writing appeared, and whose editorial staff during the first year of the magazine's existence consisted almost entirely of the writers now denounced as "revisionists."

The masthead of the December issue of *Plamuk* revealed that six of the leading dissident writers had been dropped from the editorial board. Only four of the previous ten editors were listed: A. Gulyashki and P. Matev, editor-in-chief and deputy editor, and E. Karanfilov and M. Grubeeshlieva. The "missing" editors were Manov, Genov, Severnyak, Isaev, Orlinov and Danchev.

A foreword to the December issue—signed by the remnant editorial board—reviewed the activity of the journal over the past year. It declared that "the authority which *Plamuk* has acquired both here and abroad should be maintained . . . and for this reason all its shortcomings must be honestly felt, recognized and understood." The editorial admitted that "errors" had been made in the selection of some of its articles. However, the self-criticism was fairly perfunctory: the magazine professed a "centrist" ideological position, scoring both dogmatism and revisionism, but it did not categorically repudiate its former editors or their works. Of Manov's "An Unauthentic Case," which had appeared in *Plamuk*, the editorial said that "it gives a distorted picture of some aspects of [Bulgarian] reality" but avowed that "the honesty and purity of [Manov's] intentions were a matter of knowledge to the editorial board."

Two poems by Lamar

"The Woodpecker"

This mottled woodpecker, how tirelessly
he twinkles over the dry branches,
where the worm gnaws under the bark.

Then he stops, hunts around in the space,
and in a second like a stone strikes out
scattering flame among the branches.

If I were only untiring as the woodpecker,
to pluck out the tiny worm
which has come so unwanted into life!

(*Septemvri*, [Sofia], February 1956)

"Roudozem"

In the barracks something was dripping, wind was blowing,
Someone was cursing aloud the disorder there,
And, next to him, another man, covering his head over,
Tells him gently: Go to sleep, my neighbor!

(*Septemvri*, May 1956)



Lamar (a pen name), a prominent poet and a Secretary of the Bulgarian Writers' Union.

Sketch from *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), December 30, 1954

Writers Refuse to Recant

The steadfastness of the opposition must stem from the strength both of their convictions and their numbers. It seems likely that within the Party group of writers the revisionists are now in the majority. It is also to be assumed that these writers are championed somewhere in the highest echelons of the Party leadership, where dissension between the Stalinist and "liberal" elements apparently continues behind closed doors. For the revisionists would never have been allowed to carry their cause this far, nor would their bald attacks on the entire system prevailing in Bulgaria have been made public, if regime leaders had been united in their determination to exercise their potentially absolute control.

That the revisionist writers firmly stood their ground against the critical onslaught is implied throughout the comments of Gulyashki, Abramov and *Literaturen Front*. All three Party spokesmen said that the criticized writers not only refused to renounce their errors but defended their writings and statements with "lawyer mannerisms," and "did their best to minimize the significance of their faults by bringing up matters of secondary relevance." Several of the dissident writers, including Todor Genov, said that they had been mistaken in demanding an extra-

ordinary Party Congress in July 1956. But in general they declined to repudiate their previous actions or to disavow the works they had written. Their "lack of self-criticism," complained *Literaturen Front*, was entirely alien to the "spirit of unity" prevailing at the meeting. Delchev, Stoyanov, Gochev, Manov, Genov and Velichkov were particularly scored for their obduracy.

In his concluding remarks at the meeting, Secretary Gulyashki declared:

"It is much to be regretted that these comrades, instead of showing that they have understood and felt the things for which they were criticized . . . attempted in their statements to minimize their errors and, by resorting to distortions, insinuations and adulterations . . . to prove that their guilt before the Party is less than it actually is. There were many empty phrases in Kamen Zidarov's statement. . . . Comrade Todor Genov also made miserable attempts to whitewash his behavior and his play. Gicho Gochev's defensive speech contained casuistry and an attempt to gloss over rightist dangers. It must be openly said that Emil Manov's statement was below the level of what the Party expected to hear from him. He should not be surprised if the BBC again takes him under its wing. Boris Delchev's attempt to defend the criticized comrades . . . means that he identifies himself with these views. . . .

"It is evident that the criticized comrades have not fully understood their errors . . . and grasped their guilt toward the Party. We are obliged to remind these comrades that the Party is a voluntary union of likeminded people, and that nobody will be permitted to abuse the patience of the Party. It is expected that these comrades should show by deeds, by their behavior and their works that they will stand on sound Party positions and [contribute by their works] to the . . . ideological unification of our literary front. . . ."

Aftermath

One fact to emerge clearly is that the meeting did not, as the Party intended it should, close the books on Bulgaria's literary controversy. In the January 8 issue of *Literaturen Front*, one of the writers attacked at the meeting, Panteley Zarev, charged that the paper had printed a distorted version of his statement at the meeting that "dog-

From "My Secret," by Pavel Vezhinov

PAVLOV (a Communist official who is having an illicit love affair): "I have committed no crime!"

Stefan: "A-a-a, such is your morality! A Communist, occupying a responsible post—a secret lover, secret meetings in a secret apartment! What is that, if not a crime? She gives birth to a child, lives alone—without a husband, without protection! What do you call that? You ruin the life of another person! Is that not a crime? What human and moral law exempts you from blame?"

Pavlov: "Stop!"

(*Septemvri* [Sofia], December 1956)



Lyudmil Stoyanov, an old-time "Party reliable" and well-known writer whose recent statements criticized the principle of "Party-mindedness" in literature.

Sketch from *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), December 30, 1954

matism and not petty bourgeois ideology was the cause of revisionism." Zarev claimed—citing the official minutes of the meeting—that he had actually said: "Revisionism in political life is impossible without dogmatism. Revisionism would not have occurred if the Leninist norms of Party life had been observed." Zarev thus took refuge in alleging his superior orthodoxy, a technique also often adopted by Polish and Hungarian writers in their disputes with the regime.

The campaign against "revisionism" struck in high journalistic circles early in January, with the dismissal from their posts of Stefan Stanchev, editor-in-chief of the *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), organ of the Party-dominated Fatherland Front, and Vladimir Topencharov, one of the leading journalists on his staff. A Radio Sofia broadcast on January 11 gave the name of Ilia Kilovski as editor-in-chief of *Otechestven Front*. Kilovski is known as an old Party-line journalist. He travelled to Budapest during the Revolution and filed numerous stories on alleged "savage counterrevolutionaries."

Western news sources reported that Stanchev and Topencharov had been dismissed for "revisionism." Topencharov, brother-in-law of executed "Titoist" Traicho Kostov, preceded Stanchev as editor-in-chief of *Otechestven Front*, but was demoted from this post in the summer of

1956 for excessive criticism of Chervenkov. Until recently, he had been allowed to continue writing for the paper.

Kamen Kalchev, who presided as Chairman of the Party organization's November meeting, published a lengthy postscript to the Party position in *Vecherni Noviny*, January 21. He lashed out at literary revisionism as a Western plot against the Soviet bloc, scorned the raising of "the old, ragged banner of the notorious 'freedom of the writer'" and the "aestheticism" and "ideologically empty 'intimate' lyrics" of the revisionists, accusing them of trying to turn literature back a hundred years. In defense of the achievements of Socialist realism, he invoked the Russians Gorki, Mayakovski, Sholokov, Fadeyev, Fedin and Leonov (passing over the fact that most of these fell afoul of Stalin's policy). He reiterated the thesis that renunciation of Socialist realism was tantamount to disavowal of Marxist-Leninism and the Communist spirit.

This was followed by an article by Khristo Radevski, also an orthodox writer, in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, January 26. Radevski, adopting quite a different tone, argued that young writers who go astray are suffering from ignorance and inexperience, not ill will, and that they should be set on the right path with care, understanding and "patience."

It is obvious that, in general, the Party has chosen or been forced to exercise a surprising degree of forbearance and appeasement in its dealings vis-a-vis the dissidents. The dissidents, by contrast, have been unwavering in their course and fierce in its defense. The opposition is exhibiting a solidarity which is not evident on the regime side.

Literaturen Front quoted some revealing remarks made by a writer, Ivan Martinov, at the meeting. *Literaturen Front* said: "According to Martinov, 'if we want to reach our aim, unification under the banner of the Party, we must seek and disclose the real causes of [ideological deviation]'. Martinov sees the causes in the unsatisfactory situation of the Party organizations and in the frequent and, in most cases, unprincipled struggles, strivings and personal squabbles."

Further developments in the literary controversy may be expected to emerge from the two meetings of Bulgarian writers which were due to be held at the beginning of the year. The Party organization of writers, which held the November 29-December 1 meeting, is scheduled to have its regular annual meeting shortly. Similarly, the Writers' Union normally holds its annual meeting during the first three months of the year.

Capitalism—"Socialist" Style

THE POLISH INDUSTRIAL empire of Boleslaw Piasecki continues to grow. Piasecki, a prewar Fascist who flourished during Poland's Stalinist era as head of the pseudo-Catholic group "Pax," runs a chain of factories, warehouses and stores that deal in products ranging from bricks to bibles (see *East Europe*, October 1957, page 8). Since Gomulka's rise to power the Pax organization has entered a new field and has begun to establish so-called "employees' companies." On January 21 Radio Warsaw broadcast the following interview with the Deputy Chairman of Pax, J. Hagnmajer:

"Sir, about a year ago Pax came out with the interesting innovation of establishing so-called 'employees' companies.' What are the results after a year of experimentation?"

"The experiments . . . have led to this: in Poland, or rather in 10 provinces of Poland, we have founded a total of 26 employees' companies, and this is something economically concrete, and also the statutes of the employees' company have been defined, which is important insofar as it guarantees a non-capitalist character for this sort of economic initiative."

"It would be interesting to have some particulars on the nature of this form of enterprise."

"Well, the basic difference between the employees' company and a capitalist corporation is that our company imposes on the shareholder the duty of working in the

enterprise. Also, a substantial part of the profit is not distributed to the shareholders but is earmarked for company investment. Then too, the company is required to contribute to some social activities in its locality. Finally, not only shareholders but also other employees share in the profits of the company. Lastly, the activities of the company are controlled by a body of the employees in the form of an economic council . . ."

"What kinds of industry do these enterprises engage in?"

"These companies, for the most part, supplement the production of local industries. They usually manufacture building materials such as bricks, tile, lime, prefabricated parts, etc., and in 1958, taking for example the production of bricks, these companies will manufacture six million bricks, and with respect to such important building materials as sand and gravel, they have already manufactured 350,000 tons, and as for prefabricated parts, indispensable in building—21,000 cubic meters."

"And what role is played by Pax?"

"It functions to stimulate local initiative on one hand, and to provide organizing aid on the other, and finally, should the need arise for a loan without interest, it provides capital in exchange for a share in the company. We think that creative economic elements, and those possessing some capital, will be willing to engage in this form of economic activity, ensuring a just division of profits and at the same time not overlooking the social character of the company."



PROLETARIUSZE WSZYSTKICH KRAJOW ŁĄCZCIE SIĘ

NOWA KULTURA

Masthead of the Warsaw weekly *Nowa Kultura*, where Kolakowski's articles appeared, and which is currently one of the periodicals leading the fight for the continuation of criticism. The line above the journal's name says: "Proletarians of the world, unite!"

*This is the third in a series of excerpts from the article "Responsibility and History," by the young Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, which appeared in four installments in the Warsaw weekly *Nowa Kultura*, beginning with the September 1, 1957 issue. (Excerpts from the first and second installments were published in *East Europe*, December 1957 and February 1958.) "Responsibility and History" is a detailed and brilliant analysis of many of the basic ideological preconceptions of contemporary Communist doctrine; it is especially concerned with the interaction between the processes of history and the judgments of the individual. It derives added force and interest from the fact that Kolakowski himself is a member of the Polish Commu-*

*nist Party, and editor of *Studia Filozoficzne*, the leading Polish philosophical periodical.*

"Responsibility and History" has aroused a great deal of comment in Poland, and Kolakowski has been widely attacked as a leader of intellectual "revisionism." Nevertheless, he has not, as far as is known, been subject to disciplinary action; indeed, latest reports state that he is visiting Western Europe, with, of course, the permission of the Polish regime.

The excerpts below are from the third installment of the article, subtitled "Conscience and Social Progress." It deals with the applicability of moral judgments to historical and social movements and to the actions of men as individuals.

"Responsibility and History" – III

IN THE CONTROVERSY between realism and utopianism, the arguments against the latter have been formulated so many times and in such minute detail that we shall forego the task of repeating them. However, we will cite the "anti-realistic" arguments which, for many reasons, seem to us to be currently of greater importance.

Our assumptions are as follows:

FIRST ASSUMPTION: *moral individualism. Only human individuals and their actions are subject to moral judgment.* This follows from the fact that there can be no moral judgment without considering the intentions motivating the act, because intentions are inherent in the actions of the individual man. Thus, it is necessary, in turn, to conclude that moral judgment of an anonymous historical process, and its negative and positive results, is impossible. Social groups or classes also cannot be morally judged, in the strict sense of the term, if by social class we understand—and to us such an interpretation seems accurate—not only a collection of individuals, but a specific social "entity"; that is, wherein the reactions of its human components are determined by the reactions of the class as a whole, and not vice versa.

(We will not pursue this problem in greater detail because it is not essential to the following considerations.)

Nevertheless, and in our opinion this point is of major importance, this by no means indicates that membership in a specific group or class, and only this and no other relationship an individual has to the society he lives in, is decisive in determining his moral judgments, or his behavior, which is subject to moral judgment and the range of which is quite variable in history. On the contrary we are permitted to accept the hypothesis that this determinism is absolute as formulated in the second assumption, although there is insufficient evidence for this (I have in mind here social determinism and not determinism resulting only from membership in a class), and we formulate that in the second assumption:

SSECOND ASSUMPTION: *determinism.* Opinions of what is morally good and evil, as well as good and evil in human behavior, are determined by the individual's type of participation in social life. We understand by "participation" both upbringing and the influence of tradition, as well as membership in all social groups from whose interrelations there

emerges that unique thing called personality (tradition is, of course, also a social grouping, specifically the total number of people who remain in the sphere of influence of a certain type of consciousness shaped before them). We set aside the problem of what part various forms of social life play in shaping moral judgments: how many of them grow from universal conditions of social life as such, and therefore have a *fundamental* nature universally binding; how many originate in specific conditions of class society and therefore are, in any event, extremely enduring in character; how many, finally, result from membership in a definite class, profession, etc. (this last question constitutes a summary of all the major problems of the sociology of morality, and as such is not suited for present consideration).

The essential thing is that these two assumptions are not in the least contradictory although they are so considered by many moralists. There is no logical contradiction between social determinism, interpreted even more rigorously than we would wish to do here, and the recognition of moral responsibility. From this follows the next assumption:

THIRD ASSUMPTION: a humanistic interpretation of value. Although one's recognition of a certain set of moral judgments, as well as one's moral actions, are determined, one cannot, from the knowledge of the conditions determining a man, draw conclusions about the truth or falsehood of the judgments accepted by him. In other words, from the assertion that someone knows that he accepts this or that as good or evil because these or other conditions of life have induced him to do so, it does not follow that this or that is good or evil. Everyone has certain moral opinions, but no one can demonstrate the correctness of those opinions by claiming that they arose out of the influence of these or other external causes. Thus, to say that an individual may be judged morally amounts to saying that others *have a right* to judge him, and this statement has a normative character. Consequently, its antithesis is also normative. By contending, therefore, that determinism, which is a theoretical construct, makes a moral responsibility impossible, we silently assume that moral judgments may be deduced from purely theoretical premises. If we reject the possibility of such deduction, we must recognize that the problem of determinism or indeterminism in human behavior has no logical connection with the problem of affirmation or negation of man's moral responsibility, precisely because such affirmation or negation is not a theoretical construct. Thus, the third assumption eliminates the apparent contradiction between the first and second assumptions. . . .

NEVERTHELESS, THE QUESTION with which we are concerned is by no means solved, but actually emerges as a problem. Even if it is true that individual conduct should be explained by the historical process, and not the other way around, then anyone who recognizes this truth still remains a mere individual who must at every step make a vital choice and for whom this general knowledge provides no effective instrument in making that choice. Moral choice is made no easier by the realization that it is pre-

determined, in the vulgar sense of the term, or by the fact that every component of the alternatives is enmeshed in a specific historical perspective. To be more exact, the choice remains difficult until we imagine that we possess infallible and final knowledge of the laws of historical development, and that we can read the future of the world as reliably as a railroad timetable. Once this insane illusion possesses us, however, we can probably choose much more easily, but at what cost! This cost is based on the fact that the idiocy of daily life is *apparently* overcome by having each of its phenomena fictitiously elevated to the dignity of a general historical category so that it becomes a part of some "universal" of which our cosmic vision consists. For daily life is, by its very nature, tormenting because of the lack of connections between particular events. It is an accumulation of individual situations which have only one thing in common and that is that some of them are in certain respects similar to others, thanks to which we are able to evolve some reflexes and habitual responses, selecting our reactions in what seems like an orderly fashion but in reality doing so thoughtlessly and in a purely conditioned way. In fact, however, a fragment of everyday life is spent and passes so quickly that it is impossible to take note of it, and together with other such moments it creates that hideous void where nothing is real and nothing really ex-



Nowa Kultura (Warsaw), June 30, 1957

perienced, and everything is diffused in a chaotic mass of details. This everyday life composed of separate phenomena which lack substantial connection searches for this connection in mythologies adopted by happenstance, and which are called "the purpose of life." Any individual "purpose of life" is supposed to create that continuity with regard to which every individual fact will seem to be a *modus*, this giving the course of everyday events the appearance of meaning, while, in fact, these events disappear before they have a chance to be absorbed by the consciousness, leaving after them only a sense of meaninglessness. This act of dressing one's life up with the appearance of substance, the superficial glamor of some sort of consistency and coherence induced by subordinating one's life to a single goal, may sometimes succeed. In so doing, it silences the torments of a daily life crushed by the nightmare of one's own absurdity.

Individual life-goals, those fragile mythologies which disintegrate under any external blow, may however be replaced by the armor of the philosophy of history. The consciousness permeated by historiosophical knowledge (which unfailingly arranges all facts according to general "laws," and with the power of thought infallibly penetrates the future) organizes its daily life admirably, like some magnificent edifice where each small part has a perfectly defined function and each is classified in general and overestimated categories. Every fact of everyday life becomes merely an illustration of a specific abstract category. The heap of chaotic impressions of which our existence was previously composed is suddenly transformed into a paradise of pure universals. From the hell of unconnected fragmentary events we move to the charming symmetry of a world where only ideas and symbols exist. In that world there are no individuals, or they appear only as examples of ideas with the mark of their species recorded on their foreheads. In that world we no longer eat bread and butter but we reproduce labor power consciously organized for the purpose of applying it to Socialist building. In that world we do not sleep, but we regenerate cerebral tissue to use it for inventive work in realizing the *Weltgeist*; we do not talk to men, but to carriers of ideas who themselves are only delegates of certain conflicting social forces in the gigantic advance of history. Our words are only echoes of ideas and every step has a predetermined objective, identical with that towards which historical progress is also moving with intentions we have discovered and which we know as well as we know the palms of our hands.


In this manner we are removed from the muck of everyday life to the madness of abstract life, as if we were moving from a brothel to a monastery. Social moral consciousness oscillates between two extreme forms, each of which is revealed in the course of time to be the same idiotic illusion. It is also understandable that the defeat of one of these methods of interpreting life immediately pushes one into the arms of the other, a fact easily observed in the most banal experience of life.

However, because we do not intend at present to become preoccupied with all the forms of absurdity we encounter in life, we would like to call attention to only one

of them: how can we free the morality of daily life from the nightmare of the philosophy of history and from those pseudo-dialectics which, by transforming morality into an instrument of history, in fact make history the pretext for disgraceful behavior. With this, we would like to make one reservation: we are not interested in that trivial criticism of the historiosophical world view which rejects this conception on the grounds that it "dehumanizes" the world by theoretically classifying the facts of daily life. In spite of the illusory paradise of ideas in which the historiosophically-educated consciousness moves, it is still more human and less idiotic than the typical everyday life which, in Tuwim's* words, is filled "with the torture of weekdays and Sunday boredom."

The danger of building a morality based on historiosophical vision and having meaning only within the framework of that vision does not consist in trying generally to interpret one's own life as a fragment of history, and thus endowing it, even by arbitrary pronouncement, with a certain meaning it does not intrinsically possess. The danger is based on a complete substitution of criteria of usefulness, which the demiurge of history derives from our actions, for moral criteria. The greater the degree of certainty we have concerning the demiurge's intentions, the greater the threat. The sectarian spirit is the natural enemy of the skeptical spirit, and skepticism is the best possible antidote, however difficult to apply generally, against the insane fanaticism of visionaries. This centuries-old truth should be refurbished from time to time whenever historical experiences which demonstrate this truth with particular clarity recur. When one achieves an absolute and unshakeable certainty that the kingdom of heaven is around the corner, that the "Third Order," of which Joachim of Floris wrote, is nearing its triumph and simultaneously approaching the final establishment of a new historical era, the ultimate one which "really" gives happiness and is "really" different from all the others, the only one to scotch the serpent's head and put an end to human suffering, when therefore we are hypnotized by boundless conviction that we are on the threshold of some kind of second coming, it is no wonder that this single messianic hope will become the sole law of life, the only source of moral precept, and the only measure of virtue. A consistent messianist must be convinced that he cannot hesitate to do anything that might help to bring about the new era. Morality then, speaks in the language of the Apocalypse. It sees "a new heaven and a new earth" and knows simultaneously that before the far side is reached the four angels will destroy a third of mankind, burning stars will fall, the abyss will open, the seven vessels of God's wrath will be poured over the world, and glory will illuminate the victor who crushes the heathen with an iron rod. The historiosophy of the Apocalypse, of Joachim of Floris and of Thomas Munzer, has been revived to some extent in the Communist movement. Although in this latter case it was supported by an honest and prolific effort of scientific analysis, it acted like a messianic vision in the operations of the mass movement. Prob-

* Julian Tuwim, 1894-1953, the most prominent Polish poet of the interwar period.



Nowa Kultura (Warsaw), July 7, 1957

ably it could not have been different, but awareness of this cannot provide us with a sense of security precisely because we want to prove that out of more or less reliable knowledge of historical necessities, we still cannot deduce the rules of our conduct.

In any case we take note of one of many practical lessons, which states that one needs a certain skepticism in the face of any prophetic philosophy of history which sees the future with excessive certainty. Experience shows that, as Marx wrote, it is still easy to enslave people by an independent historical process.

On the other hand history is not simply an indifferent force, aloof as the gods of Epicurus, but a series of situations in which, irrespective of our will, we are really engaged. If this involvement is to be a voluntary act of individual consciousness, it is also a moral act, at least in the sense that certain other recognized values find expression in it as determining factors.

Thus, our question is as follows: if the morality of daily life cannot be deduced from knowledge of real or alleged historical necessities, should we also defend certain moral values, arbitrarily assumed or accepted by force of tradition, even when in our opinion history turns against them? Shall we, then, propagate an antihistorical morality since we are abandoning a morality based wholly on history?

And this could be the reply: the essential social engagement is moral. Although a great political movement which aims to shape the world in its own image is created by the needs of that world and is fundamentally oriented by social developments, still every individual's access to this or any other form of political life is a moral act for which he is fully responsible. Nobody is free from positive or negative responsibility because his individual actions constitute only a fragment of a specific historical process. A soldier is morally responsible for crimes committed on the orders of his commander; even more, an individual is responsible for

actions committed, allegedly or in fact, on the orders of anonymous history. If a thousand people are standing on a river bank when a drowning man calls for help, it is almost absolutely certain that someone among those spectators will rush to help the man in the water. This quasi-statistical certainty concerns a thousand people, but it does not in the least remove the necessity for moral judgment by that very individual, the one out of a thousand, who threw himself into the river. Experience testifies in advance to the fact that there will always be one such person in a crowd. The essence of this certainty may be compared to a historical prediction in the rare cases when it comes true. However, to be that one man out of a thousand potential rescuers who realizes this prediction based on large numbers, one must carry out "by oneself" an act subject to moral judgment. By analogy: if a social system exists which needs criminals for some of its tasks, one may be sure that these criminals will be found, but it does not follow that as a result of this certainty every individual criminal is freed from responsibility. In order to take upon oneself the role of such an instrument of the system, one must intrinsically be a criminal, one must voluntarily commit a specific act subject to moral judgment. We therefore support the doctrine of the total responsibility of the individual for his own deeds, and the amorality of the historical process. In the latter case we take advantage of the Hegelian idea, but in the former of Descartes'. It was Descartes who formulated the famous principle whose implications are not always apparent at first sight: "There is no soul so weak that it would be unable to achieve absolute power over its passions by good conduct." This means that we cannot justify any of our actions by passion, by the moral incapacity to act differently, that we have no right to lay blame for any conscious act on any factor determining our conduct, because in each case we have the power to make a free choice. This assumption, mentioned above, can be accepted

without contradiction on the basis of a deterministic world view, and also embraces all the justifications we might find for ourselves in historical necessity and historical determinism. Neither our own irresistible passions ("I was unable to resist the desire"), nor anyone's command ("I was a soldier"), nor conformity with the social customs ("Everybody did that"), nor the necessities theoretically deduced from the demiurge of history ("I thought I was acting for the sake of progress")—none of these four most typical and common rationalizations of our actions has any value as justification. By this we do not mean to say that these four types of determinism do not actually play a role in life. We only assert that none of them can relieve the individual of moral responsibility because none destroys the freedom of individual choice. The individual act remains in the absolute power of the individual. We follow the main roads of our life on our own responsibility:

"Nor I, nor anyone else, can travel that road for you,
You must travel it for yourself. . . ." [Whitman]

We wish to emphasize we are concerned with *moral* responsibility. A soldier who executed erroneous orders from his commanders, orders which are militarily *ineffective*, is not for that reason responsible for a lost battle. A soldier who, on orders, participated in the mass murder of a civilian

population is responsible for homicide. His moral duty is not to obey the orders. Only on that principle was it possible to judge the SS-men.

Regardless of which philosophy of history we accept, we shall be judged justly for everything we have done in its name, and for everything which is subject to moral judgment.

It is not true that the philosophy of history determines our main choices in life. Our moral sensibility does this. We are not Communists because we have recognized Communism as historical necessity; we are Communists because we have joined the side of the oppressed against their oppressors, the side of the poor against their masters, the side of the persecuted against their persecutors. Although we know that the correct theoretical division of society is not into "rich" and "poor," not into "persecuted" and "persecutors," when we must make a *practical* choice apart from the theory, that is, a fundamental option, we are then morally motivated, and not motivated by theoretical considerations. It cannot be otherwise because even the most convincing theory is not by itself capable of making us lift a finger. A practical choice is a choice of values; that is, a moral act which is something for which everyone bears his own personal responsibility.



About Wiktor Woroszylski

THE FOLLOWING TERSE, legalistic notice appeared in *Nowa Kultura*, February 2, 1958: "Wiktor Woroszylski has resigned from his post as editor-in-chief of *Nowa Kultura*. His resignation was tendered at the expiration of a one-year term, a time period stipulated by him before he took over his duties and agreed upon by the editorial staff. Immediately following Worszylski's resignation the editorial staff elected Jerzy Piorkowsky as new editor. He was elected unanimously. To Comrade Woroszylski the editorial staff expressed its sincere thanks and appreciation for his efforts as editor-in-chief." Woroszylski is now one of the members of the editorial staff of *Nowa Kultura*, a literary journal which, even before his editorship, was in the vanguard of the Polish literary ferment. Worszylski courageously carried on this tradition even after Gomulka had launched his attack on "revisionism" and had personally censured him, as well as Kolakowski, for their heretical writings.

According to Western correspondents in Warsaw, the Party hierarchy was particularly incensed over the publication in *Nowa Kultura* of cartoons critical of the Soviet Union. To compound the felony, these appeared alongside the first Kolakowski article in the September 1, 1957 issue of the journal (they were reproduced in the December and February issues of *East Europe*). Woroszylski's demotion is therefore of political significance and does not merely reflect the routine editorial rotation implied in the official notice. The passage of First Party Secretary Gomulka's speech to the ninth plenary session of the Central Committee referring to both Kolakowski and Woroszylski ran as follows: "By his revisionist longing, Comrade Kolakowski has won the attention of the bourgeois and Trotskyite press. They print articles of his which are prohibited in Poland by the censor. Lack of time prevents me from evaluating the opinions of other revisionists in the ranks of our Party, for instance Zymand [a former editor of *Po Prostu* who was ousted from the Party when the publication was closed down last Fall] and Woroszylski. Besides, there is no need to do this. All revisionist theories are similar to one another, for they come from the same source: from the same bourgeois ideology under whose influence social democratic ideology was formed." (Radio Warsaw, May 16, 1957.)

Wiktor Woroszylski, a Party member who is now only 30 years old, made his literary debut in 1945. In 1950 he was awarded the State Poetry Prize. He spent several years in the USSR, and was pro-Stalinist; in 1956 he published some of the more interesting articles in *Nowa Kultura*, including a report from Poznan supporting the striking workers and "A Hungarian Notebook," written in Budapest during the Revolt and friendly to the insurgents. The attached photo is from *Zycie Literackie* (Cracow), October 23, 1955.

Current Developments

Area

Ideological Feud Resumed

Recent months have once again revealed overt manifestations of the areawide fear that Polish "liberalization" germs—still alive, if not flourishing as they were one year ago—might wing their way across national borders into more orthodox country. In December and January angry denunciations of Polish "revisionists" appeared in the press of the Soviet Union and the other Satellite countries. While the attacks centered chiefly on Polish Communist intellectuals and the comparatively free atmosphere in which some of them are still permitted to function, rather than on Party officials or political subjects, it is likely that the real aim of the offensive was to bring an end to all of the unorthodox—though currently backsliding—policies of the Gomulka regime. Soviet and Satellite disapproval of present Polish policy is, undoubtedly, not confined to the intellectual sphere, but also takes in other basic components of the Gomulka program, including some phases of foreign policy. It is noteworthy that the latest wave of denunciations began after the November meetings in Moscow, during which the Polish Party chief is said to have fought off attempts at a complete return to abject subservience to the Soviet Union.

The method of attack was to denounce revisionism, coupling this heresy with the names and work of Polish intellectuals. An indication of the premeditated, searching and well-organized quality of the campaign was the fact that many of these areawide denunciations were directed not at contemporary Polish writing, but at articles which had appeared one and two years previously. Similarly, the current anti-revisionist moves of the Gomulka regime, as well as its increasing exercise of control over the press, was ignored or minimized.

Poles Counterattack

Perhaps because of Gomulka's desire to placate the USSR, which had, of course, prominently participated in the attacks, the Poles did not at first retaliate. Their reticence may also have been due to the fact that the Soviet Union has, thus far, refrained from direct denunciations of Gomulka and his policies. When at last the Poles responded, they did so unofficially, not in the Party's official press, but in the Warsaw daily, *Zycie Warszawy*, January 25, and their target was not the Soviet publications, but the sycophantic Czechoslovak Party organ, *Rude Pravo*. The latter journal, on January 9, had characterized revisionism as the creation of "American imperialists," had attempted to identify it, not only with the Hungarian Revolt Premier, Imre Nagy,



"The time is now five twenty seven, girls, and in five more minutes Sputnik will be over Budapest."
"Yes but! when is the fresh bread going to be here?"
"Who on earth can figure that out?"

Front cover of *Ludas Matyi* (Budapest), January 16, 1958

and the imprisoned Yugoslav former Vice-President, Milovan Djilas, but also with Leszek Kolakowski, the beleaguered but still active Polish philosopher. To the Czechoslovak charge that revisionist tendencies are the result of "foreign espionage," *Zycie Warszawy* entered a strong denial. Referring to the Moscow Declaration of a Commonwealth of Socialist States (see *East Europe*, February 1958, pages 55-56), the Polish journal stated that "revisionism was and is an ideological problem of the Communist Parties." The counterattack continued as follows:

"In *Rude Pravo*, however, we learn that 'revisionism is not an internal, family, ideological problem of the Communist Parties and workers' movement, but is the class weapon of the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the working class.' This is indeed a rather simplified formulation. Everything can be a 'class weapon of the bourgeoisie,' even the dissatisfaction of the masses resulting from the mistakes of the people's authorities. The point is to deprive the bourgeoisie of this weapon. . . . In overestimating the significance of foreign espionage, J. Horak [author of the *Rude Pravo* article] appears to have disregarded the problem of ideology, thus severing the branch on which he, himself, is sitting."

The *Zycie Warszawy* challenge also chided *Rude Pravo*

for "amazing zeal . . . in frequently using such words as 'renegade, traitor,' etc." The Polish publication cited the Italian Communist Party as an example to the Czechoslovaks: "The Italian Communists refrained from using such epithets against Comrades who attacked certain elements of the Party line and then left the Party. Furthermore, the Italian Communists did not break off discussions with these Comrades."

The same article also defended "Eroica," a Polish film which had been adversely criticized (in *Rude Pravo*, December 21) by Soviet critic Rostislav Jurenev as "pessimistic" and containing elements of "surrealism and abstract art." *Zycie Warszawy* wondered sarcastically if "the Soviet writer . . . would prefer the film to be a sort of tragi-patriotic concoction of Unmatched Valor, Bloodthirsty Heroism, Unshakable Honor. . . ."

As a final pleasantry to their Czechoslovak detractors, the Polish journal expressed its "amazement at the lack of information [of the *Rude Pravo* writer] with regard to the problems discussed."

The Czechoslovaks were not tardy in their response. On January 30, five days after the appearance of the *Zycie Warszawy* rebuttal, they broadcast their original January 9, *Rude Pravo* article over Radio Prague. On February 4 there was a broadcast of another article (*Tvorba* [Prague], December 19, 1957) attacking Polish revisionism. This last article was directed against a Polish essay on legal problems which had appeared as far back as December 1956 in *Panstwo I Prawo* (Warsaw). The *Tvorba* rebuttal struck at the heart of one of Gomulka's most basic reforms, the strengthening of Parliament. Referring to the Polish article's demand that views on "Socialist parliamentarianism" be revised to provide "unlimited control over the State by the people and unlimited democracy," the Czechoslovak journal responded as follows:

"This would be a mistake. Only the working people—not all citizens—should hold sovereign power in a Socialist State which has not yet attained Socialism. . . . The demand for 'unlimited democracy' attacks the class basis of the Socialist State . . . and serves only to idealize the concept of a bourgeois parliament."

Another Czechoslovak broadcast (Radio Prague, February 6) continued the tactic of disinterring old magazine articles in the radio campaign against the Poles. The broadcaster used an essay from *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), November 28, 1957 which gave the following advice on how to overcome Polish economic troubles:

"No more American loans; no more fashion shows based on the theory of how to undress properly, but more work for the proletariat and for the broad masses under the leadership of the proletariat. This is the same road which the Soviet people embarked upon long ago under incomparably more difficult conditions."

Poles View Hungarians Critically

Some Polish writers have evidently found it advisable to state their minds openly without waiting to be attacked first. Thus, despite the marked lack of "provocation" from the Hungarian regime, an article in *Swiat I Polska* (War-



"Could it be possible that they'll meet?" the cartoon reflects the areawide propaganda for a top-level meeting. It is particularly interesting because it features a caricature of Bulganin. Hitherto no Hungarian paper had dared treat a top Soviet official so lightly. The cartoon therefore implies Bulganin's downgrading.

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), January 16, 1958

saw), January 5 contained the following statements:

"Sectarian-dogmatic tendencies are still fairly strong in the Hungarian Communist Party. Their mainstay is part of the Party apparatus. This is the most serious danger threatening from within the Party. It asserts itself in a hankering for the old ways of bossing about, in manifestations of impatience, intolerance, in an underestimation of the role of the masses and in a hasty bandying of the label 'counterrevolutionary'."

Another Polish article, this time in the unofficial organ of the Gomulka regime, *Polityka* (Warsaw), January 11, defended the Hungarian Communist philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs, who supported Nagy during the Revolt and who has recently been under attack in the Kadarist press (see *East Europe*, February 1958, page 45). "What seems questionable," states *Polityka*, "is the mechanical transfer of the political appraisal of a scholar's activities to his scientific output."

Soviets Set the Tone

The attacks on Polish revisionists were modeled, as always, on those appearing in the Soviet press and radio. While the leading centrist political figures (Gomulka, Premier Cyrankiewicz, Agriculture Minister Ochab, etc.) and the still formidable Stalinist wing (personified by Leon

Kruczkowski, Chairman of the recreated Party Cultural Commission) remain unscathed, such "liberalizers" as Kolakowski and the recently demoted editor of *Nowa Kultura*, Wiktor Woroszylski, bore the brunt of orthodox outrage. The former was singled out as a revisionist in a Polish language broadcast over Radio Moscow, February 5. This was only one of a series of such denunciations of the young philosopher, who still manages to remain active on the Polish literary and political scene. Woroszylski, however, was demoted from chief to associate editor of *Nowa Kultura*, after having been personally attacked in the Moscow literary magazine *Kommunist*, December 1957. In an article whose text was broadcast over Radio Moscow four days before Woroszylski's downgrading, the revisionist trend in Poland was brought into a discussion of the Soviet poet-dramatist Vladimir Mayakovsky, whose "futurist" literary work was stifled in the Thirties by the Stalin regime. Mayakovsky's writings—minus the "futurist" trends—are currently enjoying a revival in the USSR, and efforts by Polish writers, including Anatol Stern as well as Woroszylski, to interpret the full output of the Soviet poet brought about the *Kommunist* diatribe. The Soviet journal accused "Polish revisionists" of creating a "tragic legend" about the poet, of saying that, "because he turned into a propagandist for Socialist achievements, he had to stifle and contain his poetic talent." *Kommunist* also attacked the Cracow publication *Przeglad Kulturalny* for praising Stern's introduction to a collection of Mayakovsky's work. In this introduction Stern had said, "There is no cause in the world for which the poet must choke his song; such a course is against poetry and against the cause."

Bulgarians To The Fore

The Bulgarian offensive atoned in its vehemence for its comparatively late beginning. In its December 1957 issue the Party theoretical organ, *Novo Vreme* (Sofia) attacked "Polish revisionists Leszek Kolakowski, Jerzy Szacki, Jerzy Wiatr, Zygmunt Bauman, and others . . . [who] propound their anti-Marxist views under the banner of the struggle against 'Stalinism'." The journal termed "this revisionist hysteria against 'Stalinism' . . . a shameless hypocrisy . . . intended to hide their struggle against the very basis of Marxism."

Less vehement than their neighbors to the south, the Romanians also took their turn in the battering of Polish "revisionists." Politburo member Constantin Pirvulesco described a visit to Poland in *Scinteia*, December 28 and managed in his entire article never once to mention the name of Gomulka. He expressed his "conviction that the Polish working class will not allow the nationalistic, chauvinistic elements to harm friendship with the Soviet and other fraternal peoples." He admitted that "the number of collective farms [in Poland] is relatively small," but pointedly mentioned that "the Socialist transformation of Polish agriculture continues." In view of the Polish regime's "liberal" peasant policies and the actual continued decrease in total collectivization his statement could at best be construed as wishful thinking and is most probably veiled criticism of the kind now current in Moscow about

Poland's policies with respect to the Church and the peasants.

Yugoslavia Joins the Fray

Since any denunciation of Polish "revisionists" is generally taken to apply also to many of the policies of Yugoslavia, the latter country joined the Poles in the offensive. In fact they exceeded the press organs of the Gomulka regime—which were careful to attack only the Czechoslovaks—by probing the USSR itself in one of its tender, though relatively minor, spots. In a broadcast over Radio Belgrade, January 7, the Soviet novel "Not By Bread Alone," which has been denounced by USSR Party boss Khrushchev, was praised as a "penetration into an area which has often been pictured in a superficial and glossed-over manner." Later (see below), Radio Belgrade broadcast, in the Czech language, a denunciation of a book published in Prague, dealing with Yugoslavia. "Why didn't the authors adopt a more objective, honest and less prejudiced attitude toward Yugoslavia?" asked the broadcast.

On January 24 *Borba*, the official newspaper of the Yugoslav Communist Party, quoted the Polish *Polityka* defense of Lukacs (published two weeks earlier) and also advised its readers to listen to Radio Zagreb the same day for a reading of the Polish article.

Yugoslavs Score Czechoslovak Criticism

ALTHOUGH THE GREAT breach between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc is now more or less healed, and Yugoslavia is permitted to go its own way (e.g., in refusing to sign the Moscow "Socialist Commonwealth" Declaration) without overt attack, there is still a certain amount of sniping at Tito's regime. An example of this was the subject of complaint in *Kommunist* (Belgrade), the weekly organ of the Yugoslav Communist League, on January 10. It stated that the Czechoslovak Central Administration for Land Survey and Cartography had recently put out a map of Yugoslavia with a long descriptive text in which "along with certain facts, there is also a series of incorrect assertions and facts presented in a tendentious way." *Kommunist* continued:

"[The Czechoslovak description] has many mistaken details, various falsifications, certain arbitrary and didactic 'opinions' and even malicious statements. Thus it is stated that 'the State and social order in Yugoslavia is based on the results of a revolution which only partly succeeded'; that in Yugoslavia the system of State Socialist ownership—which the [Czechoslovak] authors apparently consider the only form of Socialist ownership—has been replaced by a certain 'group ownership' and by 'so-called workers' councils'; that the Yugoslav economy 'as a result of the change in course after 1948' has been 'stagnating' and is today developing in a haphazard manner. . . . This is the reason, the Czechoslovak authors said, that 'the tempo of improvement in [Yugoslav] living standards has slowed down' and that 'certain bourgeois elements have been strengthened which aim at the restoration of the bourgeois system,' etc."

Delegations to Moscow

A Bulgarian Party and government delegation, led by First Secretary Todor Zhivkov, Premier Anton Yugov and Trade Minister Boris Taskov was in the Soviet capital January 25-27. On the first day of their sojourn they conferred with Party chief Khrushchev, Premier Bulganin, and other Soviet officials. A communique, published in *Rabotnicheskoe Delo* (Sofia), January 28, stated that "matters of interest to both countries" were discussed. No particulars were given, although it is assumed by Western sources that economic aid to Bulgaria was one of the chief topics.

On January 19 *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest) announced the signing of a three-year agreement in Moscow between the Soviet and Hungarian Academies of Science. In the past such pacts covered only one year. The agreement calls for "extensive exchange of scientific data" and visits of scientists between the two countries. Two days later the same journal reported that 300 teachers had toured the Soviet Union between January 4 and 17. This is the largest academic delegation to visit the USSR. Previous groups had never exceeded 30.

Hungary

Kadar Steps Down as Premier

The January 28 session of the National Assembly saw an extensive reshuffling of positions in the hierarchy. Party chief Janos Kadar relinquished the post of Premier to Ferenc Munnich who stepped up from his position as First Deputy Premier. Into Munnich's old job went former Deputy Premier and head of the Patriotic People's Front, Antal Apro. Gyula Kallai left his post as Minister of Culture to take on increased duties in the Party Secretariat, to become one of the Ministers of State and to fill Apro's position with the Front. Former radio chief Valeria Benke became the new Minister of Culture.

The changes may reflect a crystallization of two points of view in the Communist Party. Kadar, who retained his post as First Secretary of the Party, the most powerful position in a Communist State, is generally classified as a non-Stalinist, as is Kallai who is Second Party Secretary. Both men were connected with Laszlo Rajk before the latter's liquidation, and both were jailed during the Rakosi regime; both also first took part in, then betrayed, the Revolt. On the other hand, Apro and Madam Benke are regarded as extreme Stalinists and consistently supported Rakosi. It may be speculated that the replacement of Apro by Kallai at the head of the Front is a move calculated to take some of the Stalinist-Rakosi stigma from a supposedly "non-Communist" organization. The fifth member of the government who figured in the changes, Ferenc Munnich, is a 72-year-old veteran of the movement who helped to found the Hungarian Party after the first World War.

Notable less for his ideological leanings than for his ability to survive all changes in the Party hierarchy, the new Premier first espoused Communism in a Czarist prisoner-of-war camp during World War I. He took part in

the Bolshevik coup of 1917, and two years later helped establish the Bela Kun Communist regime in Hungary. When Kun was overthrown and fled to the Soviet Union, Munnich went with him. There he worked for the Communist International, for the Soviet Security Police and received military training. Munnich served as commander of the Eleventh International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. The outbreak of World War II saw his return to the Soviet Union as a political commissar and secret police agent. In postwar Hungary he was for a time Chief of Police in Budapest. Although closely allied with Laszlo Rajk, both at home and in Spain, Munnich avoided execution and even trial. After Rajk's liquidation in 1949, the present Hungarian Premier served in relative obscurity in diplomatic posts in Bulgaria and Finland. Following Stalin's death in 1953, he became Ambassador to Belgrade, where he was at the outbreak of the October 1956 Revolt. Called home, he joined Imre Nagy's government as Minister of the Interior, then went over to the Kadar regime, first in the same post, later as Defense Minister. He became First Deputy Premier in February 1957.

Munnich's maiden speech to the Assembly was chiefly notable for his statement that he was "100 percent in agreement with the policies of the Kadar government" (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], January 29).



Polish beauty queen Alicia Bobrowska, a drama student. This photo appeared in a Hungarian magazine which described her visit to Budapest's theaters. Poland and Hungary are the only two countries in the area to have relaxed the Stalinist ban on Western-style beauty contests.

Photo from *Nok Lapja* (Budapest), January 16, 1958

250,000 Lost Working Days

"In Budapest 24,815 pregnancies were terminated in 1954, 36,383 in 1955 and 60,000 in 1957. From ten to twenty percent of the pregnancies terminated involved more or less serious complications. But even if we ignore the cases in which there were complications, the 60,000 terminated pregnancies in 1957 represent approximately 250,000 lost working days and 1.8 million *forint* in nursing expenses."

(Radio Budapest, January 25)

Conciliatory Kadar Speech

Janos Kadar's final speech to the National Assembly on January 27 (*Nepsabadsag*, January 28) reflected, to a surprising degree, many of the elements and much of the tone of the Imre Nagy "New Course" government of 1953-1955. This was especially true of those parts of the address which dealt with economic and agricultural subjects. In political topics related to the 1956 Revolt, his words conveyed an unchanged Stalinist harshness.

Kadar spoke favorably about the economic role of the independently working peasant and handcraftsman, the necessity of voluntariness in collectivization, the importance of cooperation by and with the intellectuals, the need for national independence and for a degree of cultural freedom. On the "counterrevolution" the Party leader continued the current regime fiction that the presence of Soviet troops in the country was due to the "international situation," not to internal Hungarian conditions. He said that this occupation was only temporary.

It may be assumed from the tenor of the address that the regime has concluded that it cannot function indefinitely, even under Soviet guns, without the support of the peasantry and without some backing from the intellectuals and the industrial workers. It may also be assumed that Kadar might retain some part of the "liberalization" sentiments for which he was jailed and tortured by the Rakosi regime.

The Party Secretary began his speech by praising the competence of the police, the prosecutors' offices and the courts in "safeguarding the people's interest and the constitution and laws of the Hungarian People's Republic." He called for "forgiveness" for those who had been "in error" during the Revolt, but for "the full severity of the law for the guilty." He denied amnesty toward those "counter-revolutionaries" not yet apprehended.

The Economy

Turning to the economic problems facing Hungary, Kadar couched his observations in the mildest possible language. He said that the country's economic performance in 1957 showed "truly considerable achievements," with industrial production six percent above the 1955 level (not allowing for price increases—Ed.) and farm production slightly above the good harvest year of 1955. During the

past year real wages had gone up by 14-16 percent, and the real income of peasants by 8-10 percent. The State had built 25,700 dwellings in addition to 23,000 built privately. He admitted that much of this improvement, particularly in the supply of consumer goods, had been made possible only by large foreign credits.

The adverse balance of foreign payments, Kadar implied, would be the chief problem in the coming year. Exports would have to be increased by 22 percent and imports cut by 15 percent. "As to the standard of living, I must say plainly that the aim of the 1958 plan is to consolidate the level reached on December 31, 1957. In general, there is no possibility of raising it now." Even so the plan would require a marked increase in industrial efficiency: a 6.4 percent rise in productivity and a 3 percent reduction in prime costs. He stated that in 1958 the regime would attempt to carry out its commitment to reshape Hungary's industrial structure "to correspond better with our given national conditions."

"We must primarily develop those branches of industry which require less raw material and more labor and which are competitive on the international market. For instance our machine industry will have to be expanded by 6.7 percent: the production of high power equipment increased by 11.6 percent, that of low power equipment by 16.2 percent, the production of 600 horsepower diesel electric motors doubled, and that of 400 horsepower hydraulic diesel engines trebled."

He emphasized again that the "paramount aim" was to restore the trade balance to equilibrium.

"It is a common characteristic of loans that they have to be repaid, both to friends . . . and to capitalists too. . . . Furthermore, capitalists are not very sentimental, and should an opportunity arise with a debtor they would exact compound interest from him."

On agriculture Kadar's remarks were notable for several departures from traditional Communist attitudes. While maintaining the importance of "large-scale Socialist farming," he also pledged the regime's support to private farming. In place of the customary distinctions between "kulaks" and "poor peasants" he spoke of an "alliance" with "all of the working peasantry"—indicating the degree to which the regime desires at least passive acceptance in the countryside. He also stressed the importance of agricultural exports to the Hungarian economy:

"In 1939, for instance, Hungary exported 430,000 tons of wheat. In contrast, last year we had to import wheat. In 1938 Hungary exported 64,000 tons of rye. Though we did not import any rye last year, the fact is that we had no exports in this crop either."

He said that economic recovery for Hungary would require increased production from agriculture as well as from industry, and that private farming must become more productive.

"In the GDR [East Germany] and in Czechoslovakia, for instance, because of the more advanced agricultural level, average crop yields per acre in all the main crops

are about 50 percent higher than in Hungary. This is the road of development that our Party and government wish to take together with individual peasants."

His remarks on collectivization were an open admission of the Party's quandry in seeking to "Socialize" Hungarian agriculture. He promised that there would be no effort to force the peasant into collective farms, as had been done in the past, and implied that the post-Revolt gains made by the independent peasants would not be taken away from them. "The essence of our policy is that we must work so that the individual peasant will prosper and the cooperative peasant will prosper even more. And this should bring the individual peasants nearer to the producer cooperatives [collective farms]."

"Urban petty bourgeoisie"—i.e., small shopkeepers and artisans—would continue, like the peasants, to receive qualified support from the regime. Arguing that "it would be a mistake with regard to the petty bourgeoisie of the towns to pursue a policy venturing to extremes," Kadar said that recent attacks on black marketeering, price increases and tax evasion were not directed at "the honest people, who form the large majority of the small artisans and small traders" and who would "be in a position to carry out useful activities for the good of the people for a considerable time to come. . . ."

The Intellectuals

Kadar turned next to the problem of the intelligentsia, and he did so with a sally at the Stalinists in his regime. "The Party and the government," he said, "took a decisive stand against certain one-sided and harmful views which tended, after the counterrevolutionary uprising, to brand as reactionaries or revisionists, all of the intelligentsia or whole categories of intellectuals." He went on to say that he has "no wish to fight the intelligentsia as a whole, but only the reactionary views of some of its groups." He continued as follows:

"Regarding literature, we have already clearly stated that we do not wish to resolve errors of style through government decrees. On the other hand we oppose certain literary groups which attack the Socialist and realistic method of creation under a pretext of different styles of writing and literary aspirations. We consider Socialist realism the method that best represents the aspirations of Socialism and renders the best service to the cause of progress."

The Party boss dealt briefly on opposition to his regime. "There has been opposition," he stated and divided the dissidents into two parts. The first group, "numbering several tens of thousands cannot forget or forgive the worker-peasant State for depriving them of the privileges they once enjoyed." These he classified as "enemies of the regime." He spoke of the second group as follows:

"There are others who lack Socialist awareness or live in complete political ignorance or are simply indifferent to public affairs. Although they do not fight the government, they do not support it either. It would be a great mistake to consider these people as enemies of the regime. They must be educated and they can be educated."

Munnich Interviewed

The new Premier, Ferenc Munnich, submitted to an interview by twelve American newsmen (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], January 19). Some of his more noteworthy responses indicated that the future of Imre Nagy is still unsettled, but that Revolt General Pal Maletér will be tried. About the latter he stated that "Maletér is guilty of severe crimes and this is a matter for the court." He refused to grant the reporters an interview with Nagy, stating vaguely that the imprisoned Revolt Premier "must answer for his grave offenses." Queried about the case of Cardinal Mindszenty, Munnich responded as follows:

"He is a Catholic priest, responsible to the Pope . . . whom we respect as the head of the Church. If the Pope rules that Mindszenty should remain in the American Legation, we respect this decision. Moreover, we cannot interfere with the American Legation's sense of hospitality."

Munnich sidestepped a question on whether the Hungarian and Polish delegates to the November Moscow conference had recommended several amendments to the final declaration. The Premier stated only that there had been "no differences of opinion" in the Hungarian delegation.

Apro Lashes Industrial Managers

In his maiden speech to the National Assembly on January 29 as the new First Deputy Premier, Antal Apro wasted little time on pleasantries. Though he was expected to talk on the economic plan for 1958, he confined himself instead to "the faults that were the chief characteristics of our economy in 1957." His enumeration included: excessive wage increases, waste of raw materials, violation of marketing plans by heavy industry, poor quality production and the squandering of investment funds on too many unfinished projects. He charged these shortcomings to a lack of discipline in the highest managerial levels, saying that "the practice of calling anyone to task for poor work or for irresponsible, indifferent management has become, particularly in the last few years, as rare as a white raven in the higher State leadership."

He was particularly emphatic on the necessity for economy in carrying out investment plans. Although the 1957 plan had allotted only 7.5 billion *forint* for investment compared to 11.2 billion in 1955, "ministerial enterprises overfulfilled the investment plan by over 20 percent." Hungary now has, he said, a total of 13 billion *forint* sunk in unfinished investment projects.

"For understandable reasons and not from mere whim, we reduced the [planned] investment funds for the sake of the living standard and in order to raise the volume of consumption. . . . At the same time we set the task of concentrating our forces on investment projects which could be accomplished more quickly, which could be put into operation speedily. That was a rational thing to do."

The import of his words was that the effort to reshape Hungary's economy along more rational lines had been

"They Study in Bulgaria"



Throughout the area the emphasis on contacts with countries of Asia and the Near and Middle East continues to grow. Even relatively backward Bulgaria advertises that it is a hospitable teacher to students from these areas. This picture was one of a spread in a Bulgarian foreign-language propaganda magazine showing students from, among other countries, Algeria, Syria, Korea, and Egypt, studying in Sofia. Above, left to right, a Bulgarian, a Syrian, a Bulgarian, an Albanian, a Bulgarian and an Egyptian are shown on vacation at Bankya Spa. "Firm friendships," the caption states, "ripen in the course of collective work and study."

Bulgaria (Sofia), No. 10, 1957

obstructed by vested interests at all levels of the managerial pyramid, even the highest. He singled out for special attack the Ministry of the Metallurgy and Machine Industry and the Ministry of Heavy Industry. In the latter, for example, the coal mining directorate had "frittered away" 300 million *forint* in unfinished projects, and the directorate of electric power had begun a new power station at Oroszlany "although construction of the Borsod power station will take another two years, and financial difficulties have arisen in the construction of the Tiszaalok and Tiszapalkonya power stations." Apro demonstrated that he meant business by calling on the heads of the two ministries, Janos Csergo and Sandor Czottner, to explain to the Assembly just what they proposed to do to correct these and other shortcomings he had mentioned.

1957 Plan Fulfillment

Official reports on the performance of Hungary's economy in 1957 were vigorously cheerful (see Kadar's report to the National Assembly, above). On February 1 the Central Statistical Office published a more detailed report which showed that much of the good cheer was exaggeration (*Nepszabadsag*, February 2). Though claiming that total industrial output was 17 percent higher than in 1956—the year of the Revolt—and 6 percent higher than in 1955, it revealed that in some of the most important industries production in physical quantities was still below the 1955 level. As compared with 1955, coal output had reached 95 percent; crude oil, 42; steel, 84; buses, 73; trucks, 82; cement, 84; cotton textiles, 89; and woolen textiles, 93. On the other hand, beer production in 1957 was 116 percent of 1955; sugar, 121; meat (bone in), 113; butter, 107; leather

shoes, 106; bricks, 116; nitrogenous fertilizer, 132; radios, 120; motor bicycles, 212; turret lathes, 117; rolled steel, 101; and electric power, 100. The largest increases were said to be in consumer goods production and in chemicals.

On agricultural production the report gave no final figures except to say that grain yields were unusually high. Though the area sown to bread grains was 10 percent less than in 1956, it yielded 5 percent more. On December 31 there were 3,465 collective farms cultivating 11.6 percent of the arable land, as compared to 4,858 collective farms with more than 16 percent of the arable land before the 1956 Revolt. The report made the interesting statement that the Machine Tractor Stations had turned over more than 1,000 of their tractors to the collective farms—an unheralded shift in policy which may be related to Nikita Khrushchev's campaign to give tractors to the Soviet kolkhozes. The report gave no further details.

Retail trade turnover was said to be 20 percent higher than in 1955 (in comparable prices), a reflection of the regime's effort to raise living standards by importing consumer goods. Imports of all goods were 24 percent higher than in 1955, and consumer goods amounted to 20 percent of the total. Imports of industrial raw materials had also increased, running 37 percent above the 1955 level. Exports on the other hand, totalled 18 percent less than in 1955.

1958 Plan

A formal description of the plan for 1958 was given to the National Assembly on January 28 by Arpad Kiss, President of the National Planning Office. Like the other speakers he praised the "economic achievements" of the past year and said that 1958 would see their consolidation. The three main objectives in 1958 would be: maintenance of the higher living standard achieved in 1957, but without heavy reliance on foreign credits; a large increase in exports; and a concentration of the country's scarce investment capital on projects which will yield the quickest returns.

Industrial production is expected to rise by 7.3 percent, agricultural production by 4.6 percent and the national income by 4.3 percent. Investment is to be only about 10 percent of the national income, or 9.4 billion *forint*. Coal production is to rise by 14.4 percent; crude oil by 18.7 percent; hot rolled steel by 18.8; aluminum smelting by 19; cement by 31.4; and chemical fertilizers by 28.2. The output of television sets will increase by 37,000, of washing machines by 54,000 and of woolen textiles by 1.3 million square meters.

The promised changes in Hungary's industrial structure would take several years to complete, he said, but some effort would be made to alter the composition of products in 1958 by reducing the exploitation of "unfavorable capacities." Emphasis will be placed on the production of labor-intensive and capital-saving export items, particularly in the machine industry.

Kiss warned, as did Antal Apro, that the economic plan must be carried out to the letter, and that managers must not disrupt the scheme by trying to overfulfill their targets,

speed up their schedules or use unspecified materials. "Overfulfillment of the plan is desirable only in products which are genuinely needed by the people's economy."

The State will complete 12,200 dwellings in 1958 and private construction will add possibly 20,000 more. While Kiss maintained that this would be "a further, even if modest, step toward solving the housing problem," it means a rate of building not much higher than in 1955 and substantially below that of 1956, when 49,000 dwelling were said to have been finished.

Imports are scheduled to be about 12.5 percent lower than last year, partly because of the recovery in domestic production of coal and basic raw materials. The good harvest in 1957, said Kiss, also means that Hungary will not have to import bread grain, fodder grain and fats in 1958, and will even increase its export of some farm products by 380 million *forint*. The ambitious foreign trade program calls for a 22 percent increase in total exports, but even if this is achieved Hungary will still require some foreign credit to balance its books.

Workers Show Defiance

Some locals of the largest trade union organization, the Metal Workers, have rejected Communist Party recommendations for candidates to be "elected" to the Factory Councils. On January 18, Radio Budapest stated that "workers of the light tool factory at Szekesfehervar" forced the local Communist-dominated trade union organization, under whose auspices the nominations took place, "to change the election lists nine times." The broadcast also stated that "former workers' council members are on the lists of the majority of factories."

The workers' councils have been abolished and defamed by the regime for their active part in the Revolt. There is currently a campaign to form "factory councils," allegedly to give the workers a voice in enterprise management, but actually to marshal them into more easily controllable units than were the original workers' councils. That the workers are resisting this trend and still defend their battle-won privileges is clearly shown by their admitted rejections of official stooges.

Public Stealing Increases

A rash of articles has appeared lately in the press denouncing thefts of public property and large-scale embezzlement. Politburo member Jeno Fock wrote in *Nepszabadsag*, December 26, that during the third quarter of 1957 "misappropriations of public property" reached a sum of 130 million *forint*, as compared with 20 million *forint* in the same period of 1956. A Radio Budapest commentary on January 8 stated that in Borsod County 57 million *forint* worth of property was stolen, embezzled or damaged during the first ten months of 1957. According to an item in the trade union paper *Nepakarat* on January 19, Gyor County sustained damages of 4.2 million *forint* in the first nine months of 1957. Timber thieves had cut down 20 percent of the forests in Gyor. In Csongrad County, the article said, embezzlement in the collective farms reached 30,000

"The Pretense of 'Revolution'"

IN SPITE OF ALL the warm winds of thaw and ferment that have blown erratically around Eastern Europe in the last few years, the publication of such lines as the following poker-faced perversion of reality is almost as much a matter of course in most of the countries of the area as it was in Stalin's day. They appeared in a discussion of trade unions, published in *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), the Czechoslovak Party youth newspaper, December 19, 1957:

"The trade unions not only have rights but also important duties . . . One of their major duties is to take a stand against various opinions which, under the pretense of 'revolution,' defend the 'needs' and 'interests' of the working people, but in actual fact damage the cause of Socialism. Thus, for instance, the demands for higher wages or the defense of 'soft' norms may be a purely 'Socialist' claim of some individuals who think only of their own interest without regard to the needs of society. Such people the trade union movement must fight with the same vigor as it fights citizens who misuse national insurance or who show lack of work discipline."

forint. Hungarian railways paid out 3.5 million *forint* during 1957 as compensation for thefts. *Magyar Nemzet* reported on January 31 that in Baranya County the losses exceeded five million *forint* during the fourth quarter of 1957.

"Construction material often disappears during transportation to and from the building site. . . . It is remarkable that wherever there is a large building project a number of private homes spring up. . . . Some of the owners would surely be embarrassed if asked to account for the sources of their raw material. . . ."

Central Inspection Committee

These revelations were made as part of the campaign to establish "People's Inspection Committees" in every county to supervise a cleanup program in industrial and agricultural enterprises (see *East Europe*, February, p. 45). On January 31 *Magyar Nemzet* announced the establishment of the top agency, the Central Committee of People's Inspection, headed by Janos Vezel and with Gyula Dabronaki and Ferenc Nagy as vice chairmen. Other members of the Committee include Party Secretaries, trade union leaders, university professors, a collective farm chairman and the deputy Minister of Finance.

Patriotic People's Front Trouble

There have been recent indications that the Patriotic People's Front has encountered difficulties in mustering nationwide support for the regime. A speech by Sandor Harmati, Secretary of the National Council of the organization, indicates that some non-Party members may be attempting to use the Front for "anti-regime" stands. The following

are some excerpts from the speech, read over Radio Budapest on January 10:

"The Patriotic People's Front is a peculiar form of class alliance whose fundamental aim is the incessant strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . We must resolutely combat the view that the movement is, in essence, of peasant character . . . or that the Front needs a special political program. The basis of its activity lies in the propagation and promotion of the aims of the Party and the government. . . .

"Communists active in the Front must stand firmly against anti-Party views. The Front must not become a forum for hostile views, and hostile, counterrevolutionary objectives must not be allowed to predominate in the organization."

Press Changes

In January the bi-weekly *Gazdasagi Figyelo* was changed to a weekly with the new title, *Figyelo*. Under its former name the periodical dealt only with economic subjects; now it will no longer be so restricted. *Figyelo* is to perform some of the functions of the defunct weekly *Magyarorszag*, the organ of the disbanded Tancsics Circle. The latter

journal was to have appealed to the youthful intelligentsia who had rallied to the Petofi Circle, one of the spearheads of the October 1956 Revolt.

The trade union daily *Nepakarat* began, also in January, to appear under the old name of *Nepszava*. The latter title was used by the Social Democratic Party before and after its postwar merger with the Communists, and is at present also used as the name of an emigre paper recently established in London by Anna Kethly, Minister of State in the last Imre Nagy Government. The name *Nepakarat* was adopted after the Revolt.

A new art magazine, *Studio*, has also begun publication. *Szabad Muveszet*, the former organ of the Hungarian Fine Arts Association, was abolished after its staff joined the Revolt.

Nepszabadsag reported on January 25 that "delegates of newspaper and publishing house employees" had formed a new local within the Printers' and Paper Workers' Union. According to the newspaper, "the meeting passed a resolution sharply condemning elements which had supported the counterrevolution." Apparently the aim of this maneuver is to merge the defiant journalists with the more compliant printers and paper workers.

Lutheran Bishop Attacked


Bishop Lajos Ordas, a leading personality of the Hungarian Lutheran Church who recently visited the USA, was castigated in the January 10 *Somogyi Neplap*, the Communist Party organ of the Somogyi area, for carrying out "pro-American propaganda" on his return to Hungary. "We are of the opinion," stated the journal, "that the Bishop's attitude is unworthy, considering that he is a high official of the Church and a member of the Presidium of the Patriotic People's Front." The paper added that, during a speaking tour of Somogyi, the Bishop "never mentioned peace."

On January 22 an agreement was signed between the Hungarian Lutheran Church and the regime (Radio Budapest, January 22). The Church expressed its "gratitude to the government for the aid granted thus far . . . and intends to prove its appreciation by extending active support to the State's peace efforts and its aspirations for the well-being of the Hungarian people."

Price Controls for Independent Artisans

Tailors, shoemakers and other private artisans, who have been encouraged by the Kadar regime to help fill the demand for consumer goods, will now be subject to ceiling prices established by KIOSZ, the National Association of Artisans. A government decree made public on January 22 (*Magyar Nemzet*, January 23) said that many private artisans had been guilty of overcharging. The intention of the decree, according to Bela Csikos Nagy, president of the National Price Control Board, is to stabilize artisans' prices at the level prevailing on September 1 (*Nepszabadsag*, January 22). The decree states that artisans will be allowed an eight percent profit.

The artisans have lately been under widespread attack in the press for allegedly profiteering at the public expense.



Huge neon sign reads "Warsaw Food Cooperative—Cabbage".
Szpilki (Warsaw), January 19, 1958

Soviet Trade Agreement

A three-year Hungarian-Soviet trade agreement was signed in Moscow on January 13. Minister of Foreign Trade Jeno Incze said on Radio Budapest, January 31, that the Soviets had agreed to supply all of Hungary's necessary imports of iron ore, pig iron, crude oil and ferroalloys and from 50 to 80 percent of its imports of metallurgical coke, mine props, pine boards, cellulose and nonferrous metals. The agreement will cover about 40 percent of Hungary's import requirements. Incze said that 75 percent of Hungary's exports under the agreement will be products of the engineering and precision instruments industry, while the remaining 25 percent will be mostly consumer goods. Radio Budapest added later that exports to the USSR will run 40 percent higher than in 1957, but will still be 25 percent below the volume of 1953.

Yugoslav Trade Agreement

Hungary will begin to import electricity and iron ore from Yugoslavia in 1958, according to an agreement signed on January 15 in Budapest (*Magyar Nemzet*, January 16). Other imports will include wood, chemicals and nonferrous metals as well as various consumer goods. Hungary's exports will include pig iron and rolled steel. Trade between the two countries will be almost 50 percent higher than last year.

Horvath Dies


Foreign Minister Imre Horvath died, February 2, after a gallstone operation (*Nepszabadsag*, February 3). Horvath, 57 years old, was known as a Stalinist. During the right-wing regime of Admiral Miklos Horthy between the two world wars, Horvath spent 13 years in prison. Previously he had taken part in the fighting for the short-lived Bela Kun Communist regime in 1919.

During and after the October 1956 Revolt, Horvath was Hungary's representative at the UN, where he helped implement the refusal to let the United Nations intervene after the Soviet aggression. Horvath's former wife and his son Imre took part in the Revolt and left the country after its defeat.

Poland

National Councils Elections

Elections to the National Councils took place on February 2, but the returns, which brought an easy and expected victory to the regime, were not so important as the climate in which the balloting was conducted. This climate was affected by several factors found, among Communist States, solely in Poland. First among these was the ballot itself which, though it had only a single slate of names picked by the regime, contained approximately 50 percent more candidates than offices to be filled, thus allowing a choice among nominees. Also the list of candidates had been screened in a series of apparently open "consultation meet-



Before the elections to the councils—farmer to official: "You know, it's been ages since you last asked me for a drink." Official: "Well it's been a long time since elections were last held."

Zielony Sztandar (Warsaw), December 22, 1957

ings" of the electorate throughout the country, and approximately seven and one-half percent of the original and more objectionable nominees were dropped and replaced. Second was the change—probably in the direction of true decentralization of authority and possibly leading toward democratization—in the powers of the councils.

According to a law passed in Parliament, January 25, (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], January 27), the councils will be invested with authority over State farms, industrial enterprises and cultural activities, as well as utilities and construction of housing. They will also make their own budgets and conduct their own investments. (A full discussion of the accretion of powers by the National Councils will appear in a forthcoming issue of *East Europe*.) The third noteworthy factor was the emphasis on the Eighth Plenum of the Party Central Committee (October 1956), during which the new Gomulka regime took over the government. The Ninth and Tenth Plenums of May and October 1957, which, to a considerable extent, repressed the intellectual ferment aroused by the October events, were hardly mentioned in the campaign. Along with the attention paid to the Eighth Plenum there was—perhaps only by coincidence—a series of measures which appeared temporarily to slacken some of the strictures placed on writers over the past six months.

Finally, there was the participation in the elections of non-Communists on a level more closely approaching real cooperation than is the case of similar groups elsewhere in the area. Polish religious leaders, for example, supporting the conditions of the Church-State *modus vivendi*, urged their followers to vote. In similar fashion the Gomulka regime's complaint attitude to the decollectivization of agriculture and to the revival of independent small tradesmen influenced many United Peasant and Democratic Party members to heed the call to the polls of their puppet leaders.

The Balloting

Approximately 85 percent of the electorate went to the polls, according to *Trybuna Ludu*, February 6, and about 97 percent of these voted affirmatively for the regime-sponsored single-slate list. The elections for the Cracow provincial councils were the most shunned (80.9 percent), those in Koszalin the best attended (91.29 percent). The comparable 1954 balloting had a 90 percent minimum attendance average, with approximately the same percentage voting for the regime ticket (96.24 percent).

There were approximately 300,000 candidates for the 205,101 posts to be filled in the provincial, city and town, and communal branches of the National Councils. This fulfilled the requirements of the October 1957 election law which stipulates that "the number of candidates on the list should be greater than the number of mandates for the given electoral district, but not greater than by one-half." The nominees all ran under the auspices of the United National Front whose chief components are the Communist, United Peasant and Democratic Parties, the Communist Youth Union (ZMS), the Peasant Youth organization (ZMW), the Women's League and the trade unions.



"The premiere of Juliusz Slowacki's 'Maria Stuart' was given at Warsaw's Polish Theatre . . . the title role was performed by Nina Andrycz." The lady is the wife of Poland's Premier Cyrankiewicz.

Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), February 2, 1958

Lice

THE POLISH WEEKLY *Nowa Kultura* (Warsaw), January 12, had the following remarks on the rural scene:

"One is horrified, when travelling through the northeastern districts of Warsaw Province, for example, at the sight of neglected and dirty buildings; one asks oneself whether one is in Asia or Africa. Everywhere there is squalor, disorder and bad air in the dwellings. In these conditions people live, and children, the future of the nation, grow up. One is horrified, when looking through the statistics of the National Councils' health department, to see what a percentage of the population has lice. We cannot move to Socialism with lice, with disorder and backwardness."

According to *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), January 25, the Communist Party contented itself with 50-56 percent majorities of the candidates on provincial and city lists and actually accepted a minority figure of only 33-34 percent in the countryside communal tickets. However, it should be remembered that a substantial number of candidates put forth by trade unions and other mass organizations are in or close to the Party. This is also true of many of the "independents" who appeared on the ballots; these, according to *Zycie Warszawy*, comprised from one-third to one-half of the communal tickets and one-fifth to one-seventh of the provincial and city slates. The same source gave United Peasant Party totals as 25-26 percent of provincial and city lists with 20-21 percent of communal ballots, and Democratic Party totals as seven to eight percent in the provincial tickets and 10-14.5 percent in the cities.

The actual process of elections appears to have featured a semblance of democratic safeguards. On February 2 Radio Warsaw stated that "the overwhelming majority of people cast their ballots unmarked, though many of the voters availed themselves of the screens in the polling stations." An unmarked ballot meant that the topmost names, which were those favored by the authorities, would be accorded the votes. Probably those who employed the screens crossed off some or all of the top names, thereby casting their support for names further down which, though approved by the regime, were in some cases not as cordially welcomed to the governing councils. Earlier, on January 25, Radio Warsaw announced that "press, radio, film and television correspondents will be allowed to stay in the polling stations."

Candidates Rejected

Another feature of the electoral process generally lacking in other Communist countries was the series of pre-election meetings held throughout the country in which candidates on the original list selected by the Front officials were accepted or rejected by the members of the electorate in attendance. These "consultation" meetings appear to have

been open to all voters, and though nominees could not be advanced without the Front's approval, those in attendance were able to delete names which were objectionable. Radio Warsaw on January 26 placed the total of candidates who were dropped and replaced at 22,500 (7.5 percent). In spite of this unusual—if limited and negative—electoral right, little interest in the “consultation meetings” appears to have been expressed by the people. On January 13 Radio Warsaw announced that the time for “checking the voters’ lists had been extended until January 20.” The broadcast continued as follows:

“Although the subject of the elections to the National Councils occupies an unprecedented amount of space in our press and is dealt with very extensively on the radio, on television and at meetings, the average Pole takes considerably more interest in the weather than in the elections. Up to now the voters’ lists have been checked by only a small percentage of the citizens. Almost no one appears interested in the people advanced as candidates.”

Twofold Policy on Writers

Several moves were recently made by the regime to placate intellectuals and perhaps also to gain additional electoral support. The Council of Culture and Arts, disbanded after October 1956, was reorganized, January 23, with an executive composed mainly of writers and artists untinted by Stalinism. These included Writers’ Union Chairman Antoni Słonimski and poet Adam Ważyk who recently resigned from the Communist Party.

Leon Kruczkowski, Stalinist head of the Party Cultural Commission, was rebuked for threatening to withhold publication from writers who do not toe what he interprets to be the Party line. Minister of Higher Education Stefan Zolkiewski, who is also editor-in-chief of *Polityka*, the unofficial organ of the Gomulka regime, attacked both Kruczkowski and *Trybuna Literacka*, the literary supplement of *Trybuna Ludu*, the Party newspaper (*Polityka*, January 18). Kruczkowski’s writings, as well as others which have appeared in the supplement, “oversimplify the cultural problems of the nation,” according to Zolkiewski. He went on as follows:

“In this respect they lead us back to the deplorable atmosphere of the past [pre-Gomulka regime] period. At that time discussions were not carried on with the real arguments of one’s opponent in mind, but with arbitrarily prepared and simplified caricatures. I do not need to prove how harmful this vulgarization of our real cultural problems is to our Socialist development. . . . Literature intended only ‘to cheer our hearts’ has always been full of lies and alien to the people.”

Another action of the regime which must have been pleasing to non-Stalinist writers was the awarding of the literary prize of the Polish Association of Book Publishers on January 11, 1958 to Marek Hłasko, whose short stories have been denounced in the Soviet press. (For full texts of two Hłasko stories, see *East Europe*, September and October, 1957.) Similarly the *Nowa Kultura* literary prize went this year to Aleksander Wat, a poet who spent two of the postwar years in Stalinist prisons.

After the election, however, the climate turned again to chillness. The demotion of Wiktor Woroszylski from his post as chief editor of *Nowa Kultura*, after yet another Soviet press blast against him (see Area, above) dramatized anew the fact that Polish writers are no longer allowed to stray far from the Party line. The post-election strictures may have been anticipated by the same January 18 issue of *Polityka*, which denounced writer Jerzy Putrament, who has, nevertheless, managed to thrive both in the Stalinist and Gomulka eras. Putrament’s latest work was censured for “absence of political content.”

Democratic Party Meets

Both the “non-Communist” parties made news during the election campaign. The puppet Democratic Party (SD) leadership assembled its members, January 15-18, in its first Congress since 1954. The meeting was addressed by United Peasant Party (ZSL) boss Stefan Ignar and Communist Party chief Władysław Gomulka. The SD adopted a resolution in which it “accepted the leading role of the Communist Party in building Socialism,” but the organization which controls 39 Deputies in the Parliament did manage to re-elect three of its liberal members—J. K. Wende, Jerzy Jodłowski and Włodzimierz Lechowicz—to its presidium. Puppet Chairman Kulczynski carries on in office as before.

It is significant that the SD, which claims to represent small tradesmen, independent artisans and handicraft workers, and some of the intelligentsia, did not elect its leaders unanimously. Only 89 percent voted for the list presented by the presidium. A Radio Moscow broadcast on January 20, two days after the SD Congress closed, in discussing the Polish election campaign stated that “the enemies of the popular democratic regime seek support among the kulaks, small tradesmen and employers and also among the backward intelligentsia.” This could have been an unsympathetic characterization of the SD membership.

The Moscow broadcast may also have been motivated—



Drawings illustrating an article attacking “Western decadence” among Czechoslovak youth. In all the more orthodox countries of the area, the more violent forms of jazz, rock ‘n roll, zoot-suiters’ ways and dress, have all been linked with the current wave of crime and “hooliganism” among youth.

Drawings from *Svet v Obrazec* (Prague), February 1, 1958



Students of the Academy of Arts in Cracow. For criticism of such "Westernized" ways see the Czechoslovak drawing on facing page.
Przekrój (Cracow), December 8, 1957

in its mention of "kulaks"—by Soviet dissatisfaction with the general state of affairs in the Polish countryside. ZSL chief Ignar has for the past four months railed against local leaders of his own organization who have not cooperated with the Communist Party. During the election campaign both Communist and high-ranking ZSL officials charged that some Peasant Party organizations discriminated against the Communists in the countryside and attempted to bar pro-Communist ZSL members from the Peasant Party.

In his speech on the first day of the SD Congress (Radio Warsaw, January 15), ZSL leader Ignar summarized the present Polish situation as follows:

"The line of the October [1956] changes is Socialist democracy. It is expressed in the restoration to the Sejm [Parliament] of its proper role as the highest organ of power, in the broadening of the prerogatives of the Peoples' Councils, in the decentralization of the management of industry and the formation of workers' councils, in the reactivation of agricultural collectives and in development of peasant self-government. It is expressed in the replacement of administrative orders in the management of the economy and by the observance of the demands of economic laws. All this leads to the creation of a new economic and political model suited to the needs of our community and to the development of our motherland."

Gomulka Speaks

Communist Party First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka addressed the Democratic Party Congress on January 15 (*Trybuna Ludu*, January 16). His speech appeared to have the intention of reassuring his listeners of the permanence of both the Eighth Plenum reforms and their own party organization. Characterizing the SD as a "non-Marxist party," which, nevertheless, "declares for Socialism," Gomulka stated that he disagreed with those "who find contradictions in this state of affairs." He averred

that there was "enough room, as well as much need" in the country for both the SD and the ZSL "to live an independent life." The Party chief's stress on the changes brought about by the Eighth Plenum was made, among other passages, in the following one:

"The attitude of the Communist Party toward one of the fundamental components of your [SD] party, the craftsmen and small-scale traders, was fixed by the Eighth Plenum and has not been changed. We declared that there was room in Poland for the development of private crafts, services and trade. In many later statements this attitude has been elaborated in detail, and it will express the policy of our Party for a long time to come."

Verification Campaign Founders

Results of the "verification" campaign to purge the Party of factionalists and corrupt or passive members were announced in *Trybuna Ludu*, January 27. According to the journal, 80 percent of the basic Party organizations have completed the verification process and 17 percent of their membership have been expelled or crossed off the membership lists. Of these, 50 percent were either industrial or farm workers, 22 percent were peasants, the remainder white collar employees. "Passivity," the newspaper states, "is the most frequent reason for striking out a Party member." *Trybuna Ludu* also complained that "the low percentage of officials [purged from the ranks] is due mainly to the atmosphere of mutual tolerance and indulgence prevailing in the ministries, institutions and offices affected."

That the verification campaign, begun so optimistically at the October 1957 Tenth Plenum of the Polish Party Central Committee (see *East Europe*, December 1957, pages 33-38), has disintegrated into angry bickerings, revengeful denunciations, or ordinary bureaucratic whitewashes, has been indicated by many articles in the press over the past months. For example, Radio Warsaw on

January 13 quoted the periodical *Trybuna Mazowiecka*, as follows:

"The progress of the campaign thus far reveals many factors which hamper the development of verification. This is true primarily of various strong cliques which apply reprisals to those who attempt to unmask them. Facts are known of blackmail attempts on people who have made criticisms, as well as cases of personal revenge, terrorism and intimidation. Also important is the deeply-rooted conviction that no criticism can be of any consequence. Many people, too, cling to the old maxim that 'it is better not to become unpopular.'"

Apparently many of the old wounds have been opened and recriminations between Stalinists and "revisionists" and Gomulka centrists, as they attempt to purge one another, have been intensified, while the Party itself has become less rather than more unified. The personality clash, which seems to have taken over from the proposed ideological purification, was treated extensively in the Communist ideological periodical, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), January 3. "Personal problems," according to the journal, "have overshadowed the ideological achievements of the Tenth Plenum . . . and it is clear that the ideological-political weakness of the verification procedure is the source of all shortcomings." The article chides the "anti-intellectual tendencies" of some Party branches, the "relapse into sectarianism" of others, the "anti-religious sallies" heard at many meetings. Also deprecated were "religious discussions quite unnecessarily unleashed in a number of basic Party branches . . . notwithstanding the systematic warnings of Party bodies against the possibility of perversions in this sphere." The periodical also commented sadly on the fact that "ENDEK [National Democratic] and CHADEK [Christian Democratic] elements" had cropped up in various Party branches.

Rapacki Plan Receives Setbacks

With the refusal to accept the Rapacki Plan in its present form by the American, British, French and West German Governments, the proposal for a "de-atomized zone" to include at least Poland, Czechoslovakia and East and West Germany, would appear to have suffered a major reversal. However, the existence of some areas of support for the Plan in Western quarters gives assurance that Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki and his Soviet allies will continue their efforts in its behalf. The Poles managed to obtain an agreement from the USSR—probably at the Gomulka-Khrushchev meeting in January—that inspection of the "de-atomized" areas would be permitted.

Western Governments have taken the position that a withdrawal of American forces—which is also envisaged by the Plan—and a West Germany armed only with conventional weapons would destroy the NATO organization and leave the Soviet Union—even with its troops withdrawn to its borders—as the sole major nuclear power in Europe.

Rapacki and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko discussed the Plan for five days in Moscow. At the conclusion of their meeting, they issued a joint communique, February 2, expressing their agreement on the feasibility

of a "control system" for the area. Their statement also implied Soviet willingness to withdraw from East Germany and Poland, if the US took its troops from Europe. All the countries in the orbit have recently endorsed and widely propagandized the Polish Plan and the suggested enlargements and modifications.

Court Decisions Stiffened

The official Polish news agency revealed on January 27 that 5,859 applications for extraordinary reviews of criminal cases were lodged with the Ministry of Justice in 1957. Of these, 521 cases, involving 670 people, were ordered to be reconsidered. In 329 cases the revisions went against the defendants, and in the other 341 cases the revisions were favorable. The number of unfavorable revisions went up substantially in the last quarter of 1957, 211 being against the defendants, 85 for them. According to Radio Warsaw, January 27, "this shows that the Ministry has recognized a number of sentences pronounced by the courts during that period as too lenient."

On January 22 *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) announced the passage of a law stipulating a minimum of five years imprisonment for criminal offenses in which the damage is between 50,000 and 100,000 *zloty*, and at least eight-year sentences for "graver damage."

Prison Labor in Mines Ended

Swiat (Warsaw), January 5, announced that the mining industry would no longer be supplied with convict labor. According to the journal, the last group of prisoners left the mines on December 21. *Swiat* hailed the move as a happy break with "another remnant of the past."

October Rioters Exonerated

Five persons accused of taking part in "hooligan excesses" in Warsaw in October 1957 were exonerated "because of insufficient evidence" (Radio Warsaw, January 26). Although the broadcast did not enlarge on the "hooligan excesses," they were undoubtedly part of the rioting which occurred after the banning of *Po Prostu*, the militant youth weekly. Other "rioters" had previously been sentenced to prison terms ranging from 18 months to three years.

Passport Fees Raised, Then Abridged

Complaints from press and radio caused a revision in the new and higher scale of fees for passports and exit visas. The original price boost, announced over Radio Warsaw, January 13, set the cost of passports valid for European countries at 3,000 *zloty*, for overseas countries at 5,000 *zloty*. Prices for exit visas were to range from 2,000 *zloty* for a single border crossing to 5,000 *zloty* for several crossings. These rates would have placed foreign travel almost out of the realm of possibility for the average Polish worker (whose salary is approximately 1,500 *zloty* per month).

A Radio Warsaw broadcast to Poles abroad on January 16 bewailed the consequences of the new charges, especially to those with families living abroad. *Zycie Warszawy*, February 8, disapproved the new rates and cautioned the au-

thorities to "think three times" before putting through such controversial measures. On the same day the Ministry of Finance announced a modification of the charges. Persons going abroad for scientific, cultural, education or health purposes will have to pay only 250 *zloty* for a passport and 250 *zloty* for an exit permit. Those who obtain hard currency from abroad and who have their return trips covered from abroad will be charged 500 *zloty* for passports and the same sum for exit visas.

PAP, the official Polish press agency, stated on January 25 that 177,000 Poles visited abroad last year. 61,913 of these traveled to the West.

Czechoslovakia

Ferment Among Intellectuals

The press continues to abound with evidence of the smoldering discontent of intellectuals at regime repression and control. This resentment manifests itself in a shunning of "Socialist realism" and a return to subjective topics and methods of artistic creation, in an increasing interest in Western culture, and in a repetition of the areawide pattern of "silence" which dissident writers have adopted in the face of heavy censorship.

The disenchantment with "Socialist realism" was treated by *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), January 16, which denounced the trend toward subjectivism as "lamentation and melancholia over the hopelessness of life." The journal charged that "such whimpering things are unworthy of being written." The same day *Rude Pravo* voiced a similar criticism in regard to painting.

"We had a period of direction in our culture whose mistakes were classified as dogmatism. This has now been replaced by a period even more in conflict with the Party's resolutions and Lenin's principles, a period of directionless culture and art, of mere outline, of unprecise guidance. The practical result is a new danger. We are faced with lack of ideas, with the application of bourgeois ideology, with the retreat from revolutionary concepts of art, with, in short, liberalism."

Interest in Western writers has led to a series of "literary Tuesdays," devoted to readings and discussions of the works of Faulkner, Hemingway, Caldwell and Steinbeck, according to *Vecerni Praha* (Prague), December 20. The journal stated that these Tuesday meetings had been carried on in Prague "for some time," but did not particularize further. "New works of French, Italian, Scandinavian, South American and Soviet literature will be treated in later programs . . . and there will be an evening devoted to Franz Kafka," the periodical concluded.

The Christmas issue of *Kultura* (Prague) quoted the seasonal wishes of "cultural workers," as follows:

"Jan Bauch, painter: 'May there be a restoration of artistic societies catering to various creative opinions.'

"Frantisek Filipovsky, member of the Prague National Theater: 'May all windows of the world be opened to our artists.'

"Karel Novak, artistic chief of the Olomouc Regional

Theater: 'May all artistic blossoms bloom, may different schools of thought contend.'

Revisionism in music and art were condemned during the Slovak Party Central Committee meeting (see above), according to *Pravda* (Bratislava), January 15. The meeting was said to have produced criticism from the floor of the magazines *Slovenska Hudba* (Slovak Music) and *Kulturny Zivot*, both of which were castigated for statements that the shortcomings in Slovak music were due to insufficient contacts with Western musical events.

The prominent critic, Jiri Hajek, attacked the "silent" writers in the Party organ, *Rude Pravo*, January 7. These "reserved heroes," as he sarcastically called them, "have not yet rid themselves of the defensive attitude they assumed last year." Hajek continued as follows:

"Active responsibility for the Party's literary policies is less important to them than their predilection for the role of mere spectators. They observe the way things are developing, what the 'course' will be like, but they are unwilling to commit themselves. But they do not realize that it is no longer possible, even in the literary press, to preserve artificially the present state of 'ideological armistice' between correct, less correct, and entirely false opinions."

Slovak Nationalism Troubles Regime

The growing Slovak aversion to Prague centralism, coupled with strong nationalist feelings historic in the Slovak people, have combined to form a major problem for the regime. At the January meeting of the Central Committee of the Slovak Party (see *East Europe*, February 1958, pages 49-50) First Secretary Karol Bacilek spoke as follows of the widespread dimensions of "bourgeois nationalism":

"Not even the Communist Party itself is free of bourgeois nationalistic influences. This is proved by past events. During the pre-Munich republic, the Party was forced several times to combat the carriers of bourgeois nationalism. . . . Such tendencies were revived after the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress [February 1956], and they have continued into the present period. This has happened at a time when the Party is faced with serious and far-reaching problems, when it is changing the methods of planning, financing, management and organization of industry, when it has proclaimed as its slogan the completion of Socialist construction in our country. We meet the influence . . . of bourgeois nationalistic tendencies at present in various fields of our cultural, political and scientific life, in sports, in the State apparatus, in the economic organs and so on. Even the films, press and radio are not free of these influences. Bourgeois nationalistic tendencies have also appeared recently in some of the central [that is, Prague and Bratislava] offices."

Bacilek blamed part of the revival of nationalism on "those whom we have deprived of political power and the opportunity of exploitation . . . former capitalists, businessmen, landowners, and rich industrialists." He added that officials of the "former Republic and of the Fascist Slovak State" were also carriers of nationalism. Some of these, he averred "pose as workers . . . and some have entered the ranks of the Party."

Slovak Manpower "Recruited"

One of the contributing sources of Slovak nationalism may be the transfer of Slovak workers to other provinces. The newspaper *Praca* (Bratislava) stated on January 3 that 30,000 people were to be "recruited in Slovakia" in 1958. Among these would be 8,600 coal miners for Ostrava, 1,300 settlers for the border area, 3,600 seasonal agricultural laborers, 2,000 for the Klement Gottwald foundries in Kunice and the Vítkovice steel mills, and 5,400 construction workers for the Karlovy Vary, Ústí nad Labem and Ostrava regions.

Praca did not enlarge on the methods which would be used in this "recruiting drive."

1957 Plan Fulfillment

On February 6 the State Statistical Office published its report on the results of the 1957 economic plan. A summary broadcast by Radio Prague on that date stated that national income rose in 1957 by 7.4 percent and industrial production by 10.2 percent. Production of the means of production increased by only 9.7 percent as against a 10.9 percent increase in the production of consumer goods. National consumption rose by as much as national income, giving point to recent warnings of the regime that real wages have been rising faster than productivity (up "almost 6 percent" according to another broadcast) and that wage rates must be stabilized in the coming year.

Production figures were given for specific products as follows (percentage increases over 1956 in parentheses): hard coal, 24.2 million [metric] tons (3); brown coal, 49 million tons (10); lignite, 2.2 million tons; electric power, 17.7 billion kwh (7); iron ore, 2.8 million tons (10); pig iron, 3.6 million tons (9); steel, 5.2 million tons (6); rolled products, 3.5 million tons (7); cement, 3.7 million tons (17); bricks, 2 billion units; motor fuels (32); nitrogenous fertilizers, 74 thousand tons (15); phosphorous fertilizers, 110 thousand tons (3); sulfuric acid, 445 thousand tons (5); conventional machine tools, 21,954 units (15); diesel engines, 16,259 (2); passenger cars, 34,561 (38); motorcycles, 138,347 (24); tractors, 21,236 (18); radios, 254,169 (15); television, 79,107 (97); household refrigerators, 66,143 (14); washing machines, 291,696 (15).

Strides in Collectivization

The broadcast account gave no figures for agricultural production, saying merely that "overall agricultural production was on the level of 1956." A later commentary said that crop production was lower than in 1956.* However, the report claimed considerable success in the campaign to collectivize agriculture. During the year 3,074 new collective farms had been established, making a total of 11,090. The collectivized area at year's end covered 61.1 percent of the arable land, as compared with 39 percent at the end of 1956; and 57.4 percent of the agricultural land as compared with 44 percent last September 30. The "Socialist sector" of agriculture (collectives plus State farms and other government-owned land) included 65.5 percent of the agri-

cultural land.

Foreign trade rose by 5.3 percent, and 32.7 percent of it was with the USSR. Gross investment in the national economy reached 32 billion koruny.

The commentary that followed the broadcast version of the report pointed out that hard coal production, which rose 3 percent, was behind the plan target; and that investment construction had lagged "precisely in the three most essential regions. Ostrava, Ústí nad Labem and Karlovy Vary, in which 40 percent of our total investment construction is concentrated."

Khrushchev's MTS Proposal

Nikita Khrushchev's recent proposal to give tractors to Soviet collective farms apparently took the Czechoslovak Communists by surprise. The Party newspaper *Rude Pravo* and the Ministry of Agriculture's organ *Zemedelske Noviny* devoted long articles on January 30 to explaining why the new Soviet policy would not be feasible in Czechoslovakia. In the USSR, they said, collective farms are much larger and it is no longer economical to maintain separate centers for machinery. In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, one tractor station services a number of collective farms as well as independent farms. *Rude Pravo* argued:

"Under present conditions there are only a very few collective farms which, because of their size and their organizational capabilities, could make full use of [heavy machinery]. . . . What should we say in conclusion? That what has already matured in the Soviet Union is only beginning to bloom in our country. Perhaps this simile will best explain what is happening in the Soviet Union and what we are doing in our own country."

"Spy" Hunt

After a series of widely publicized "confessions," the regime stepped up the tempo of its unabated witch hunt. Among "unmasked agents" mentioned most prominently in the press and over the airwaves was Stanislav Sosik, who held a press conference at the Journalists' Club in Prague, during which he claimed to have acted as an agent for US, British, French and West German "espionage services" (Radio Bratislava, January 9). Others who "confessed" were soccer player Josef Crha (*Rude Pravo*, January 25) and Frantisek Havelka (Radio Prague, February 1), both of whom stated they had given "information" to the same Western "espionage services." The information revealed by Havelka and others was alleged by Radio Prague on February 3 to have led to the arrest of a group of "spies" (number undisclosed), led by Stefan Palounek, described as a "technical clerk at the Ministry of Heavy Industry."

Frantisek Vratny, employed at the Czechoslovak Consulate in Hamburg, was also arrested (*Rude Pravo*, January 29). He had been living with his family in West Germany since the end of World War II, but, according to Western sources, had accepted an invitation by two members of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior to visit his homeland last November. The announcement of his arrest was the first indication of his whereabouts since his disappearance from the Hotel Merkur in Prague, November 26. His wife and son remain in Hamburg.

* According to *Zemedelske Noviny*, February 7, crop production declined 4 percent in 1957. Livestock and dairy production rose 2.9 percent, although the number of cows dropped 65,000.



Czechoslovak Premier Siroky and India's Nehru signing a joint declaration. At left is Vaclav David, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister; at right, Indian Defense Minister Krishna Menon. The top-level Czechoslovak delegation recently toured India, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon.

Photo from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), January 18, 1958

On December 29 *Rude Pravo* announced the sentencing of four members of the Bratislava soccer team to five-year terms in jail for "supplying intelligence information" during team trips to Austria in 1955 and 1956. Vladimir Fiala and Dezider Gregus received sentences of twelve and ten years respectively for alleged membership in an "anti-State espionage group organized by Jaroslav Vodicka, an agent of the US Intelligence Service" (Radio Bratislava, January 11). An unspecified number of defendants in the same trial were handed sentences ranging from one to seven years.

Radio Brno announced, February 6, that the Ministry of the Interior is to open an exhibit in Brno "showing results of the fight against spies and diversionists sent to Czechoslovakia by American, British and French espionage services." The propaganda campaign is particularly interesting in view of the controversy that has developed between Czechoslovaks and Poles over the role of "foreign agents" in fomenting "revisionist" ferment in the area. The Poles maintain that the problem is mainly an internal one, while the Czechoslovaks stress the so-called imperialist danger.

Siroky Returns From Far East

Premier Viliam Siroky returned, February 4, from his month-long tour of the "uncommitted" nations in the Far East. In an interview, broadcast over Radio Bratislava the same day, he spoke of the "unlimited possibilities of cooperation" between Czechoslovakia and India, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon. Economic relations with these countries, he said, "have been marked by a growing volume of exchange of goods and commodities." As evidence the Premier cited the recent contract for delivery of equipment to "a large metallurgical plant in the Indian Republic."

Railway Troubles

Dissatisfaction with the railroad system was expressed in *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), January 23. The journal complained of "enormous delays in transportation" and stated that the railways were not being used to full capacity. It suggested revised loading and unloading schedules, increased night and Sunday work. Lack of freight cars in the mines was alleged to have caused a loss of one million tons of soft coal and to have brought corresponding decreases in

miners' pay. Cement factories had also been "hampered," according to the publication, while stocks of goods worth "scores of millions of koruny" had accumulated without being delivered to waiting customers.

On January 9, Minister of Transport Antonin Pospisil, who had been in charge of the railway system, was transferred to the top position in the Ministry of Power. The former Minister of Power, Frantisek Vlasek, became Minister of Transport (*Rude Pravo*, January 9). Two days later the Party organ stated that a "document" on the railroad situation had been issued by the Central Committee for study by Party membership meetings at railway centers. The contents of the "document" were not made public.

Bulgaria

Ferment and Disunion in Party

Evidence of both intellectual and political rebelliousness continued to crop up in the press, as did fulminations by Party officials and propagandists against every indication of heretical tendencies. Yet the ferment goes on, and—from the tone of editorials in the official publication, *Rabotnicheskoe Delo* and *Nove Vreme*—appears to have caused considerable disorganization in the Party itself.

On January 26 *Rabotnicheskoe Delo* spoke of "a number of Party organizations in which harmony has been violated." The Communist daily cited also "the insufficient attention which Party organizations pay to ideological work, and the concepts and prejudices alien to Marxist-Leninist ideology which are spreading among certain elements of the population, particularly the growing generation." The journal criticized "numerous Party members" who did not perform the duties assigned to them, and stated that life in many Party organizations was "monotonous and tedious." After reminding its readers that the July 1957 Central Committee Plenum had "instructed Party organizations on how to deal with those who systematically attempt to disturb unity," the newspaper stated that "not all Party organizations have taken decisive measures to strengthen themselves."

Four days later the Party daily was again thundering its disapproval at the state of affairs within the Party. This time the chief target was the rank-and-file of the Central Committee Department of Agitation and Propaganda (Agit-Prop):

"The ideological-theoretical level of Party propaganda is still low. Inaccuracies are permitted in the explanation of Marxist-Leninist theory. Our Party propaganda, both oral and written, is not militant enough either in character or spirit. It fails to unmask the manifestations of bourgeois ideology or of revisionism. . . .

"Our press, the central and local newspapers, as well as the theoretical and other magazines, publish only a small number of theoretical articles against revisionism and the manifestations of bourgeois ideology. It is the duty of our Party to the international workers' and Communist movement to be irreconcilable in the fight against revisionism and bourgeois ideologies."

The amount of dissent within the Party—indirectly indi-

cated by the *Rabotnichesko Delo* complaints about members who fail to carry out their duties and organizations which do not follow Party directives to strengthen themselves—was also touched upon in an article in the Party theoretical journal, *Novo Vreme* (Sofia), December 1957. “Are there manifestations of revisionism and opportunism in our Party?” asked the publication. Its answer was as follows:

“Unfortunately it must be admitted that, even in a Party such as ours, educated for decades by Georgi Dimitrov in the Bolshevik spirit and in loyalty to proletarian internationalism, not only revisionist tendencies, but also displays of bourgeois laxity have occurred in a few places. If the Central Committee had not taken prompt measures to end these manifestations, grievous harm could have been inflicted on the Party.”

Writers' Revolt Continues

Intellectual ferment rolls on unabated, in spite of the Party's determination to root out all signs of nonconformist thinking. (For earlier news and fuller treatment of this subject see Bulgarian Writers' Revolt, pp. 15-23.) One example of a young essayist's attempt to evade Party dictates on “correct” commentary was Luben Dilov's article on the August 1957 Moscow Youth Festival, which appeared in the Sofia periodical *Septemvri*, December 1957. Excerpts follow:

“You cannot fall in love with Moscow right away. She is like a woman with whom love at first sight is impossible. In the beginning such a woman may even seem ugly. Later, however, you realize that she is far from ugly, that her lips are tender, her smile warm, her eyes soulful—Oh God, what a soul she has! . . .”

Dilov spoke of the delegations from the non-Communist world at some length. Most of these, he said were “confused by the reactionary press, but showed courage and a desire to understand the people from the ‘other world.’” Dilov also dealt with “provocateurs,” who he said were “few and unsuccessful, but whose actions were interesting.” He continued:

“Some of the provocateurs' methods revealed our own weakness in the struggle against hostile influences among the youth. Primarily ‘rock and roll’ and so-called modern art were their main weapons. . . . It must be acknowledged that they aroused great interest among the youth of the Socialist camp. I was convinced that we alone have made ‘rock and roll’ a weapon in the hands of Western imperialists. Immunity against sickness is achieved, not by trying to keep a person from becoming ill, but by injecting harmless bacilli into the blood in order to form antibodies.”

Dilov also wrote of post-card reproductions of works of modern art which were handed out by some of the Western delegations:

“This ‘art’ interested our youth. They were piqued by their uncertainty about it, because no serious article has yet appeared in our own press on the subject. We have, instead of explaining it, silenced or abused it. By ignoring ‘modern art’ we boost its importance to dimensions it does not contain.”

The ruling clique of the Writers' Union, accustomed only

to superlatives in reference to Moscow, sharply attacked Dilov in the Union's publication, *Literaturen Front* (Sofia), January 16. Excerpts follow:

“Like a precious aesthete, not of our world but of the world of fashionable Western bourgeois journals, Dilov completely neglects the fascinating beauty of the city. . . . We leave aside the absurdity of his comparison [of Moscow to an amorous woman], but we cannot pass over the offense he commits not only against Moscow, but against all those who are fascinated by it, who love and esteem the great city.”

The journal commented less bitterly upon Dilov's suggestion that “rock and roll” and modern art should be seriously “explained” in the Communist press. “These ideas . . . merely uncover his helpless perplexity,” stated the periodical. It concluded with a statement that Dilov's editorial office should have “helped” him before the article was published.

The Party artistic and cultural journal, *Narodna Kultura* (Sofia), February 1, criticised Bulgarian painters for yielding to “bourgeois ideology” in their work. The publication warned the artists that an “implacable struggle” against such tendencies would be waged in the future.

American Jazz Deplored


The Party youth journal, *Narodna Mladezh*, in its January 9 issue, frowned upon some “very doubtful jazz performances,” recently heard in the country. Local audiences are offered “mostly Western jazz music,” said the publication, “and it is impossible to discover, even with a magnifying glass, popular melodies by contemporary Soviet composers.”

Narodna Mladezh dealt with Negro influence in Western jazz as follows:

“In justification for the alarming manifestations of jazz, people answer that this is the music of the Negro people. But this is not Negro music. The musical art of the Negroes has been distorted by American composers. Commercial jazz has been prostituted. According to Paul Robeson, there has been a merciless distortion of several excellent examples of Negro music in order to meet the requirements of a capitalistic society.”

1957 Plan Fulfillment

The report of the Central Statistical Administration on the results of the 1957 economic plan was published by *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) on January 28. Production figures were given as follows (percentage increases over 1956 in parentheses): electric power, 2,655 million kwh (11); “coal,” [including lignite] 11,886 thousand tons (10); crude oil, 285 thousand tons (16); iron ore, 271 thousand tons (15); copper ore, 562 thousand tons (20); lead-zinc ore, 1,953 thousand tons (17); rolled steel, 116,724 tons (18); [no figures given for steel ingot production, said to be lagging]; lead, 19,030 tons (217); zinc, 7,513 tons (29); electric motors over 5 kw, 9,669 (202); tractor cultivators, 2,004 (10); tractor plows, 4,303 (28); tractor sowers, 2,069 (9); nitrogenous fertilizers, 191 thousand tons (16); calcined soda, 95 percent pure, 95,000 tons (10); sulfuric



Pictures of a dance given by the Warsaw students' club "Hybrid," from *Stolica* (Warsaw), Oct. 6, 1957. Accompanying text notes that students' clubs, begun as discussion groups and forums for student dissatisfaction, have increasingly turned from fruitless political discussion to entertainment. Note "American" dress and dance styles.

acid, 40 thousand tons (42); caustic soda, 96 percent pure, 12,934 tons (16); automobile tires, 104 thousand (8); cement, 880 thousand tons (2); plate glass 2 mm thick, 3,648 thousand sq. meters (7); plywood, 3,248 thousand sq. meters (14); electrometers, 181,320, (19); radio sets, 108,487 (18); cotton fabrics, 153,330 thousand meters (8); woolen fabrics, 13,316 thousand meters (5); silk fabrics, 6,376 thousand meters (20); shoe leather, 132,860 thousand sq. decimeters (29); leather for upholstering, etc., 84,506 thousand sq. decimeters (23); shoes, 5,179 thousand pairs (32); meat, 114 thousand tons (7); meat products, 21 thousand tons (15); canned vegetables, 94 thousand tons (19); butter, 5,359 tons (15); cheese, 22,427 tons (11); lard, 10,580 tons (56); sugar, 117 thousand tons (9); tobacco products, 12,470 tons (5).

Agricultural production, according to the report, was 16 percent higher than in 1956. Though it gave no precise figures, it said that the harvest of wheat was more than 600 thousand tons higher, corn 400 thousand, sugar beets 500 thousand and grapes 170 thousand, compared to 1956.

The investment plan was said to have been fulfilled 100.3 percent, although previous reports had admitted that it was fulfilled by only 78 percent in the first quarter of the year, 89 percent in the second quarter and 88 percent in the third quarter (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, April 28, July 24 and October 25, 1957). Among the projects completed were new coal mines with a capacity of 280,000 tons, the first blast furnace in Bulgaria with an annual capacity of 117,000 tons of pig iron, a fourth open-hearth furnace at the Lenin steel plant, and two hydroelectric stations.

Collectivization Continues

Although the Bulgarian regime claimed last October that collectivization of the peasantry was virtually completed—some 86.5 percent of the arable land and 82 percent of the households—the drive has been resumed in mountainous and hilly areas long considered unsuited to large-scale collective farming. In the latter half of January newspapers and radio broadcasts announced that private peasants were “applying” to join collectives. They included Turkish growers of tobacco in Haskovo County (Radio Sofia, January 22), 2,637 households in the district of Stara Zagora (Radio Sofia, January 25), 1,215 farmers in Omourtzg County (Radio Sofia, January 24), hundreds of farmers in Balkan mountain villages (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, January 22) and others in the counties of Aitos and Belogradchik.

A *New York Times* dispatch from Sofia on January 25 reported that in the villages of Dragalevtzi and Semyonovo on the outskirts of Sofia the inhabitants were forced to join collectives at gunpoint. “During the night of January 22-23,” the dispatch said, “both villages were surrounded by squads of Communist Party stalwarts and policemen armed with machine pistols.” On February 4 Radio Sofia announced triumphantly that all the farmers in the village of Dragolevtzi now belonged to the collective farm.

1958 Budget

On February 4 the National Assembly approved the

budget for 1958. The breakdown, as given by Finance Minister Kiril Lazarov in his speech to the National Assembly (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, February 4) compares with last year's budget as follows (in millions of *leva*):

	1957*	1957	1958
	Planned	Realized	Planned
Revenue	18,503.3	18,987	19,887.7
National economy	14,296	16,855	17,668
Turnover tax	6,800	7,258	7,258
Profits from enterprises	2,118	2,014	2,513
Other	5,378	7,583	7,797
Taxes from the population	1,164	1,442	1,461
Unspecified	3,037	594	1,758.7
Expenditures	18,424.3	18,812.4	19,753
National economy	10,400	10,656.9	10,980.5
Social and cultural	4,413	4,476.8	4,884
National defense	1,500	1,539	1,677.9
Administration	687	702.3	653.1
Unspecified	1,420	1,437.4	1,557.5

Lazarov said that enterprise profits in 1958 are expected to total 3,437 million *leva*, of which 924 million will be left with the enterprises for working capital, investment and other purposes. Total capital investment in industry is planned at 4,033 million *leva* in 1958, of which 1,751 million will be supplied by the enterprises themselves and 2,282 million by the national budget. The new budget provides relatively little for the people's councils, which are expected to become largely self-supporting: whereas in 1956—two years ago—the State provided 66 percent of the people's councils' revenues, in 1958 it will give them only 22.7 percent.

Romania

Personnel Changes

The number of Vice Presidents of the Presidium of the National Assembly (the powerless “Parliament”) has been increased from two to three (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], January 12) with the “election” by the Assembly of fellow-travelling intellectual Mihail Ralea, the Communist regime's first Ambassador to Washington in 1947. The other two Vice Presidents are Communist Anton Moisescu and “non-Communist” novelist Mihail Sadoveanu.

Ralea's elevation brings another “non-Communist” to prominence on the Presidium of the National Assembly, perhaps to balance the fact that Party member Ion Maurer replaced “non-Communist” Petru Groza as President of the Assembly (and hence, of the Republic) after the latter's death early in January (see *East Europe*, February 1958, page 51).

Radio Bucharest announced on January 25 that Atanese Joja, Minister of Education and Culture, would assume the post of Deputy Premier. Joja will also continue in his former position.

* *Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 15, 1957.

Recent and Related

Russia Since 1917, by Frederick L. Schuman (*Alfred A. Knopf*: \$6.50). This thoroughly documented re-interpretation of Soviet Russia's domestic and foreign affairs traces the course of Soviet power from the days of the October Revolution down to the era of the "big thaw" and the crises in Eastern Europe and Suez. The core of the book is the complex interaction between domestic problems and foreign outlook in the Soviet system. After describing the influence on modern Russia of barbarian migrants, Mongol invaders and Romanov tsars, Dr. Schuman shows how Communism in actual practice has contrasted with the ideological theories of Karl Marx. He analyzes significant aspects of Soviet politics, economics and society, and records his personal impressions of Russia from his third trip there in 1956. The changing relationship between East and West is given particular attention by the author. He gives a new perspective to the struggle of the Allies against the Bolsheviks in 1919-20, the era of coexistence between two world wars, the crisis of Fascism, the "cold war," and the crucial years since the death of Stalin. The book is marred by the naivete of some of Dr. Schuman's assumptions. Appendix, indices.

Limited War, The Challenge to American Strategy, by Robert Endicott Osgood (*University of Chicago*: \$5.00). In defense of the principles of limited war, Mr. Osgood has examined the role of war in American foreign policy and the evolution of American strategy in this decade. He states that the United States has failed to anticipate and counter the Communist threat because of a deficiency in American attitudes rather than lack of competence or power. The United States must develop a successful strategy of limited war, Mr. Osgood argues, and must use this strategy as an essential instrument of foreign policy. To accomplish this, he states, there must be a fundamental change in traditional American attitudes concerning the nature of war and the relationship between force and policy. Notes, index.

Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924, by Allen S. Whiting (*The Columbia University Press*: \$5.50). The twofold question to which this study is directed is: how did Soviet policy in China evolve, and

what were the implications of that evolution for Soviet Russia's position in the Far East? Beginning with an examination of Lenin's writings on China prior to 1917, it traces the shaping and reshaping of his ideas under the impact of the events of 1917 to 1920, the period of civil war, foreign intervention, and consolidation of Bolshevik power. The Second Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) receives detailed notice. The second half of the study follows in detail the efforts of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) to win recognition from the Chinese Republic while reasserting Russian influence in the border areas of Outer Mongolia and North Manchuria. Introduction, appendices, notes, bibliography, index.

The East German Rising, by Stefan Brant, Foreword by John Hynd, M.P. (*Frederick A. Praeger*: \$3.95). An account of the uprising of June 17, 1953 and the succeeding days, and an appraisal of their long-term repercussions. The author, who was on the spot during the uprising, begins with the blueprint for Red Germany conceived by the Soviets after World War II. He then goes on to show how this plan was modified and implemented through the years until the mounting controls and repressions led to the final "chain reaction." For the English-language edition Mr. Brant has provided additional facts and comments based on the more recent developments in the area. The translator is Charles Wheeler; the original German edition was called *Der Aufstand*. Illustrations.

Human Relations and Power: Sociopolitical Analysis and Synthesis, by Albert Mueller-Deham (*Philosophical Library*: \$3.75). The author's intent in writing this book was to set forth an integrated approach to general sociological theory. With the contention that all social attitudes and activities are contained in social relations and processes, an analysis of these social relations is attempted. The resultant conceptions are applied to politics and ethics, including a sociological analysis of a number of past governments. Some of the types of States discussed are: the totalitarian State, pure democracy with uniform power, limited democracy with divided pow-

er, the "concentration State," and the State in sociological equilibrium or balanced State. The final chapter is a consideration of an international organization and world government. Preface, introduction, appendices, index of subjects and names.

Soviet Transportation Policy, by Holland Hunter (*Harvard University Press*: \$8.50). An examination of the history of Soviet transportation policy from the middle 1920's to the present day. The author first takes up the Soviet geographical setting and its "locational objectives" and problems. He then discusses the relationship between industrialization and transportation, the Soviet railroads in World War II, postwar expansion, and freight and passenger transportation; the last section deals with railroads as a sector of the economy and covers past growth and future prospects. The relatively minor role of river, sea, highway, and pipeline carriers in the USSR is also explained and some attention is given to Soviet regional development policy. Analysis of data for the years 1928-1940 and 1945-1955 leads the author to predict that growing transportation needs will not slow down the rate of Soviet economic growth in the next few years. Introduction, bibliography, notes, appendices, index.

A Guide to Communist Jargon, by R. N. Carew Hunt (*The Macmillan Company*: \$3.50). "Marxism-Leninism" has given rise to a number of political or semi-political concepts which the Communists use in explaining or defending their position. This book enquires into the meaning of the more important of these and shows how they are related to one another. Despite the often-raised argument that the Communists do not really take these concepts seriously, Mr. Hunt points out that they do deserve attention as representing what the leaders have reason for wishing the public to believe. This glossary defines and discusses in some detail fifty basic terms, such as Aggression, Bourgeois Democracy, Coexistence, Formalism, Proletarian Internationalism, Purges. These concepts are defined not only as set forth by Marx, but as reinterpreted by Lenin and Stalin and the various Party-Line decrees. Introduction, index.



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